

EIGHT
SPEECHES

Made in PARLIAMENT,

On Several

Important Occasions.

Recommended to the Electors of *Great-Britain*, as a Seasonable PREPARATIVE for the ensuing Elections.



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
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
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*Sir JOHN KNIGHT'S
SPEECH in the
House of Commons 1694,
against the BILL for
Naturalizing Foreigners.*

Mr. SPEAKER,



Have heard of a Ship in
a violent Storm, in danger
of perishing every mo-
ment; [it was not such a
sham Storm as we were
lately entertained with in
the *Gazette*, which deceives the People,
that many Ships going for *France*, laden
with Corn, were cast away, tho' those
B Ships,

Ships, and many more are since safely arrived in *France*; but it was such a real Storm, as on the 7th of the last Month destroyed on the Coast of *Cornwall* upwards of 70 Sail of our *English* Ships, most of which were laden with *Corn*, and several sorts of Provisions, for the use of our *Dutch* Allies, to enable them to live cheap, by making the same dear at Home; perhaps some was for the Support of our half-starv'd and unpaid *English* Soldiers now in *Flanders*; when perished likewise more than 700 Sailors, who have left a great many Widows, Children, and poor Relations, to curse our Conduct at Sea, the cause of this Calamity: In such a Dreadful Storm it was [that the foresaid Ship was in] when the good Commander seeing the Danger, and apprehending Death, desired his Crew to assist with Resolution, and preserve themselves and the Ship, which the Sailors refusing to do, he retired to his Cabbin, humbled himself in Prayer, and implored the Powers, that alone can save in time of Need; that tho' the Ship and the Company might be justly swallowed up, for the Disobedience of the Sailors, yet that he, and his Cabbin might suffer no Damage.

Sir, I cannot, as that good Commander did, be so vain as to hope, that either my self, or the Place for which I serve,
can

can be preserved from the general Inundation, which this Bill we are now debating lets in, on the Liberties of my Native *Country* and Country-men ; and therefore be unconcerned for the Good of *England*, provided *Bristol* were safe : To hope for and expect Happiness in Life, when all Mankind but my self are Dead, would not be more deceiving, than to propose Comfort and Security to my self and *Corporation*, when Strangers are admitted to possess and enjoy, by a Law, all that's valuable in the Kingdom ; for this Bill doth enfranchise all Strangers that will swear and protest against *Popery*, with the Liberties of every *English* Man, after the vast Expence of Treasure and *English* Blood, it hath cost this Kingdom in all Times and Ages of our Fore-fathers, to secure them to themselves, and their Posterity.

Wherefore, Mr. *Speaker*, I must beg pardon, if at this time I cannot sit silent, but express a zealous Concern, as well for the Kingdom in general, as for the Place I Represent in particular ; and I am more moved thereunto, whilst I see so many Members sent here by their *Country*, for the Conservation of the *English* Mens Liberties, so warm as to part with all to Strangers with one Vote.

The Argument of the Honourable Person near me, to render all the Care of our Fore-fathers of no Esteem amongst us, who are, or ought to be the Representatives of the Kingdom, was to prove, that this Age and Generation are Wiser (he did not say Honefter) than the former.

I remember a West-country-man, many Years past, undertook to prove the same to me, and my Company beyond Sea, by declaring his Father was a Fool to him : I yielded him that point, by concluding both to be such, and yet our Fore-fathers might be Wise Men ; I shall not at this time question the Wisdom of those who promote the Bill, or their Fathers. For my self, I declare in behalf of the Wisdom and Honesty of our Predecessors ; nor can I Assent to the yielding up of the Liberties and Laws they derived unto us, only because some Gentlemen think better of themselves (and perhaps mistakenly) than of their Parents.

*Sir, I was early instructed in a Principle of Deference to the Wisdom of our Ancestors ; and at this time I tremble, when I reflect on the Correction given me by my Master, that I might not forget, but imitate and defend in all times this Rule :
Let them only be accounted Good, Just, and Wise Men, who Regard and Defend the Statutes, Laws, Ordinances, and Liber-*

Liberties, which their Fore-Fathers Wisdom and Experience obtained for themselves and Posterity. Now it is my Opinion, Mr. *Speaker*, that if those Gentlemen who approve of this Bill, had not only been taught that Rule, but as well Corrected as my self, they would be of my Judgment ; and I wish that they who depart from that Rule, and sacrifice our *English* Liberties, to a number of mercenary Foreigners, may not meet with a much more rigorous and exemplary Chastisement from their enraged and ruined Country-men.

The Arguments used for the Bill, are in substance these : *First* A want of Purchasers for our Lands. *Second*, Of Merchants. *Third*, Manufacturers, who can work cheaper than the *English*. *Fourth*, Husbandmen to Till the Ground.

To all these I shall return short Answers ; but if I debate not on them with that Advantage and Reason as our Land Admirals can (no doubt) with great Ingenuity on Sea Politicks, I hope the House will pardon me, for my Observations never cost the Kingdom such Expence of Money at Home, and Losses at Sea, as hath the Experience of those Honourable Persons in Sea Affairs.

First, It's Argued by some, that we want Purchasers for the Lands ; this is

a melancholy Consideration ; I therefore desire those Gentlemen who approve of this Bill, to tell me what it is hath brought us to this Condition, that the Landed men of *England* are Reduc'd to so Low an Ebb, that they must Sell, and none left able to Buy, unless Foreigners are Naturalized. Doth this prove our Fore-fathers wanted Understanding? Or, doth it not rather conclude it's occasioned by our want of theirs, and not following their Examples, who never Taxed their Country to the Ruin both of themselves and their Posterity? nor did they Expend the Money of the Kingdom on such Allies as Ours: who, as we have been informed by some of the *Privy-Council*, are not in our Interest, and will spare us none of their Men for our Pay, without great Pensions likewise for themselves. Can any Man hope to perswade me, that our Fore-fathers would have brought Foreign Soldiers into *England*, and pay them, and Naturalize them likewise, and at the same time send the *English* Soldiers abroad, to fight in a strange Land without their Pay?

Let us abate our Taxes, and after the wise Precedent of our Fathers, pay our own Sea-Men and Soldiers at home, and send the Foreigners back. Then the Money will be found circulating at home, in such *Englishmens* hands, who may
Buy

Buy the Lands that are to be Sold, without Naturalizing Strangers.

Secondly, It's said we want more Merchants: Whom may we thank for bringing so many to Poverty? but I shall forbear grating, and desire the Liberty to consider in short how the Trade of *England* hath hitherto been carried on. Gentlemen have placed their younger Children to Merchants; their Masters observing their Honesty and Diligence, when they have gained some Experience in the necessary parts of Trade, generally send them abroad to *Turkey*, all parts of the *Levant*, to *Spain*, *Portugal*, East and West-*Indies*; and all parts where *England* holds any considerable Commerce; there the young Men are employed by, and entrusted with the Stocks and Estates of their Masters and Friends, whereby all Parties, both the Principals at home, and the Factors abroad, are advantaged, and *England* enriched (for there in the end all centers) and at last, when they are satiated with Gain, they return to their native Soil, their Friends and Relations, for Ease and Enjoyment, making room for a younger Generation to succeed in their profitable Employments. Thus hitherto this Kingdom hath advanced in Riches, whilst Foreigners could not with success plant their Factories on us, through the Advantage

we had by our Laws; let us but turn the Tables, and consider the consequence; Suppose we pass this Bill, and the *Dutch* (who no doubt will take the Oaths as this Bill directs, and protest against *Pope-ry* and *Paganism*, and, on Occasion, *Christianity* too, as at *Japan*) send their Servants and Factors hither, and we Naturalize them, and let the Capital Stock, which gets an Employ to these new made *Englishmen* belong to their Masters and Friends, who never did or ever will live amongst us; will it not then follow, that the Profit will be theirs and not *England's*, and will not the New-made *English* (yet *Dutch Men* still) return to their Country and Friends with their Gain, as our People hitherto have done? We may observe by our Inland Trade, that it's seldom they who make the Manufactories gain Estates, but those who employ their Stocks in buying and selling what others make; and it's the same with the Merchants; those that Export and Import are the Gainers; the first Maker very seldom, the Consumptioner never.

The Conclusion then of this Experiment must be this. That what hath hitherto been Gain to *England* by *English* Merchants and Factors, will be turned to a Foreign Land, by the Foreign Merchants

chants Naturalized, for their own Good, not *England's*.

But this is not all, for at once the Art of Navigation will be rendered useless. Whence then will be a Nursery for Sea-Men? For Foreign Merchants will Naturalize Foreign Sea-men; and when the Press-Masters find them, they will *Dutchen spraken, ya min Heer*, and avoid the Service, but at the *Custom-House, Exchange*, and in all Corporations, they will be found as good *Englishmen* as any be of this House; from whence it followeth, that Trade will be only carried on by Foreign Merchants and Sea-men, and the *English* Sea-men condemned to our Men of War, and perhaps live there, as hitherto, without their Pay, till another Million be owing them for Wages, and in the *interim* have this only Consolation and Reward for Service done, and to be done, that their Wives and Children may be subsisted with the Alms of the Parish, whilst Foreign Soldiers are maintained at home and abroad with *their* Pay.

A third Argument for admitting *Foreigners*, is upon a supposed want we have of *Manufacturers*, especially such as will work cheaper than the *English*; In my Opinion this Reasoning is extraordinary, and ought not to take Air out of the House, lest the old *English* Spirit should exert

exert it self in defence of its Liberties ; for at this time, when all Provisions are become excessive dear by the great Quantities exported to *Holland*, which puts the poor *English* Manufacturers on starving in most parts of *England*, for want of a full Employ to enable them to support their Families, by their honest and painful Labour and Industry, shall an *English* Parliament let in Strangers to under-sell our Country, which they may easily do, whilst they live in *Garrets*, pay no Taxes, and are bound to no Duty ? How shall we answer this to our Country, who sent us here ? when by so doing, instead of making the Kingdom more populous, we provide only for the Subsistence of Foreigners, and put our Country-men to the Choice of starving at home, or to turn Soldiers, and be sent to *Flanders*, and starve there for want of their Pay ? for it's well known, that, at this time, more Commodities are made in *England* than can be consumed abroad, or at home, which makes the poor Manufacturers so miserable. All Country Gentlemen within this House, have for several Sessions laboured, what they could, to raise the price of the Provisions which their Lands produce, and some think it not great enough yet, and they would despise that Man, who should endeavour to lower the Rates, by proposing

a free Importation of *Irish* Cattel and Corn, tho' he had no other design, than that charitable and necessary one of relieving the poor; and yet these very Gentlemen are for this Bill, because they would have the Labour of the Poor brought to a lower advantage: In my Opinion this is a very unequal way of reasoning, that whilst we raise the price of the product of the Land, for the Gentlemen to live in greater State, at the same time our Consults are how to make the half-starved Manufacturers, that live by their daily Labour, more and more miserable. What Opinion will the Common people of *England* have of this House, and the Gentlemen of the Kingdom, whom nothing can please, but what is made by Foreigners, or comes from abroad?

Our Palats for a long time have been so nice, that nothing but a *French* Cook could please, nor could we perswade our selves that our Cloathing was good, unless from Head to Foot we were *Alamode de France*. The Gentleman was not well served without a *Frenchman*, and the Lady's *Commode* could not sit right, if her fine *French* Woman did not put it on: Now, on a sudden, the Change is as violent in favour of the *Dutch*, who are great Courtiers, and the only taking People, and our *English* are a sort of Clumfy-

Clumsy-fisted People, if compared with the modish *Dutch Hans* and *Fro*, and in short the *Englishmen* are fit for nothing but to be sent to *Flanders*, and there either to fight, steal, or starve for want of Pay. There is one thing, Mr. *Speaker*, which comes into my mind, with which I shall close this Consideration. What Reason was there for blaming the Mayors, Aldermen, Common Councils, and other Governours of Corporations, for surrendering their Charters, tho' they still retain'd the Rights for *Englishmen only* to come into new Charters, and at the same time hope to justify our Proceedings, tho' we throw up the Great Charter of our *English* Liberties, to admit Strangers?

A fourth Pretence for this Bill is, A want of Husbandmen to Till the Ground, I shall say little on this Head, but request the Honourable Person below me, to tell me of the *Forty Thousand French*, which he confesseth are come into *England*; How many does he know, that at this time follow the Plow tail? for it's my firm Opinion, that not only the *French*, but any other Nation this Bill shall let in upon us, will never transplant themselves for the Benefit of going to Plow; they will contentedly leave the *English* the sole Monopoly of that Savery.

Upon

Upon the whole, *Sir*, it's my Judgment; that should this Bill pass, it will bring as great Afflictions on this Nation, as ever fell upon the *Ægyptians*, and one of their Plagues we have at this time very severe upon us; I mean, that of their Land bringing forth *Frogs* in abundance, even in the Chambers of their Kings: For there is no entering the Courts of *St. James* and *Whitehall*, the Palaces of our Hereditary Kings, for the great Noise and Croaking of the *Frog-Landers*.

Mn. Speaker, This Nation is a *Religious, Just, and Zealous* Nation, who in some of their Fits and Zeal, have not only Quarrelled and Fought for the same, but have Murthered and Deposed *Kings, Nobles, and Priests*, for the sake of their Religion and Liberties, which they pretended to prove from the Bible. We are the *Religious Representatives* of this *Religious People*. Let us therefore learn Instruction in this Case before us, from that good Book; where we may be informed, that *St. Paul* by being born Free of Heathen *Rome*, escaped a Whipping, and valued, and pleaded that Privilege, and the Chief Captain of the *Romans* prides himself, that he, with a great Sum, had obtained that Freedom, and feared greatly, when he had violated *St. Paul's Liberty*,
by

by binding of him; and shall we set at nought the Freedoms of the *English* Nation, who are a Religious Christian Kingdom, and part with the same to Strangers, for nothing, unless the undoing of our own Country-men, who sent Us here, *but not on this Errand*? Certainly we should follow the Example of the *Roman* Captain, and fear and tremble when we consider the just Provocation we shall give to the Kingdom, who will expect that we Preserve, and not Destroy every *English* Man's Birth-right.

Sir, We may further learn, from that Book, the Fate of the *Ægyptians*, who experimented, on the Score of Charity, what it is a People may expect from admitting Strangers into their Country and Councils; *Joseph* was a Stranger, sold a Slave into *Ægypt*; yet being taken into *Pharaoh's* Council, he, by Taxes, and other fine Projects, brought the seven Years plenty God had blest the *Ægyptians* with, into the Granaries of *Pharaoh*; but when Dearth came on the Land, and the People cryed to their King for Relief, they were sent to the Stranger *Joseph*, who getteth from them, for that which was once their own, all their Money, their Cattle, their Lands, and last of all, their Persons into Slavery; tho, at the same time, he did far otherwise by his own Country-men, for he

he placed them in the best of the Land, the Land of *Goshen*, and nourished them from the King's Store. This Example should teach us to be wise in time, seeing all this was done by the Advice of one Foreigner in the Privy-Council; and what may that Country expect, where the Head, and many of the Council are Foreigners?

Sir, I perceive some Gentlemen are uneasy, perhaps I have offended them, in supposing they are Religious Representatives; or concluding that their Religion is to be proved from the Bible; if that be it which displeaseth, I beg their pardon, and promise not to offend again on that score; and will conclude all with this Motion, That the *Serjeant* be commanded to open the Doors, and let us first Kick the Bill out of the House, and then Foreigners out of the Kingdom.

The

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The

Mr. Price's S P E E C H in the House of Commons in 1696, for the Repealing a Grant made to Min Heer Benting, of several Lordships belonging to the Principality of Wales.

Mr. SPEAKER,



THE Petition now presented unto you, in behalf of our selves and Country-men, tho' subscribed by few hands, yet has the Sense and Approbation of Thousands, who are not influenc'd by their own Interest, but by the Honour they have for the Crown, and the Welfare of the *British* Nation.

If I could conceive that the Glory and Grandeur of *England* was, or could be upheld by a poor Landlefs Crown, and a miserable necessitous People, I could then be easily perswaded to believe, that his Majesty was well advis'd to Grant away all the Revenues of the Crown, and that his Government thereby could be well secured, and his People best protected when they had nothing left them. I am sure this is not *English*, but Foreign Policy, who may revere the King, but hate us.

The

The Kings of *England* always reigned best when they had the Affections of their Subjects; and of that they were secure, when the People were sensible, that the King was entirely in their Interest, and loved the *English* Soil, as well as the People's Money. When Kings had a Landed Interest coupled with their Power, then it was most stable and durable; as is manifest by the ancient Demefne-Lands, and other large and Royal Revenues; the many and great Tenures the People then held their Estates under, which created then such an indissoluble Union and Dependence, that they supported each other; and it is observable, that the Separation of the Revenues from the Crown, has been in all Ages the Occasion of rendering the *English* Government precarious: And that it might not be so, your Petitioners, with a dutiful Deference to his Majesty, do represent to you (the Great Council of the Nation) This, Theirs, and the People's Case, for Redress and Remedy according to your Wisdoms.

Give me Patience and Pardon, and I will lay before you the true State of the Fact upon the Petition, the Manner of the Grant, and what is granted.

The Three Great Lordships, or Hundreds of *Denbigh*, *Bromfield* and *Yale*, in the County of *Denbigh*, for some Centuries,

turies, have been the Revenues of the Kings of *England* and Princes of *Wales*, to which Lordships your Petitioners, and above Fifteen Hundred Freeholders more are Tenants, pay Rents, Suits of Court, and other Royal Services. These Lordships are Four Parts in Five of the whole County, being the best and most plentiful Part of the Country, and Thirty Miles in Extent.

The present Rents to the Crown are but 1700 *l. per Ann.* besides Heriots, Reliefs, Mises, Wafts, Estreats, Perquisites of Courts, and other contingent Profits. There are also great Wafts and profitable, of several Thousands of Acres, rich and valuable Mines, besides other Advantages a mighty Favourite and great Courtier might make out of this Country.

Your Petitioners being casually informed last Summer, that a Grant to the Earl of *Portland*, of the Lordships of *Denbigh*, *Bromfield* and *Tale*, was at the Treasury, in order to be passed, your Petitioners did oppose the said Grant; and, upon considering the Grant, they found not only the Three Lordships, but also near 3000 *l. per Ann.* of your Petitioners and their Countrymens ancient Inheritances expressly Granted. So that, if all that was comprized in the Grant had passed, it had been a very noble Royal Gift, worth
at

at least 100,000 £ . Nor was this Grant made for any short Time to this Noble Lord, being to him and his Heirs for ever; and yet not much to the Advantage of the Crown, having only a Reservation of Six Shillings and Eight-pence a Year to the King and his Successors.

These Facts were laid before the Lords of the Treasury, by your Petitioners, who cannot say, but they were well heard, well understood, and hope, truly represented; only with this Remark, that the Docket sign'd by the Lords of the Treasury for the Grant, was dated and carried to the Privy-Seal, a Month before the Lords of the Treasury had ordered your Petitioners to be heard at the Treasury against the Grant. The next Stage we had was to attend that noble Grant from the Treasury to the Privy-Seal, where, I must confess, our Reasons and Complaints were heard with all Candour and Goodness, by that Noble Lord who had the Custody of the Seal; and I believe sincerely, has truly represented the whole Affair: And that is the Reason, at present, that this Grant halts, I suppose, till the Parliament rises, and then I doubt not but it will find Legs, and take its Journey.

Having made our Applications in the proper Place, to stop the said Grant, and that without Success, it becomes a Griev-

ance, and we hope this Honourable House will redress it.

These Lordships, for many Ages, have been the Revenues of the Kings of *England*, the Support of several Princes of *Wales*, have been settled upon them and their Heirs, by sundry Patents of the Kings, and confirmed by several Acts of Parliament.

This Royal Dominion, in most Reigns, has been attacked by great and powerful Favourites, but with little Success; for, in the Fourth of Queen *Elizabeth*, some Parts of this Revenue were granted to some of her Creatures, but attended with so many Law-suits and general Disturbances, that the Queen interposed, and the Freeholders gave large Compositions for their Peace, and the Queen, by her Charter, confirmed their Estates.

In the Fourth Year of King *James* the First, these Lordships were settled upon Prince *Charles* and his Heirs, Kings of *England*; but his Servants were (as most Courtiers are) willing to make use of their Opportunities, and had gotten some Grants of great Part of these Revenues, and proved so vexatious and troublesome to the Country, that the Freeholders came to another Composition, and gave 10,000 *l.* for their Peace, and for the settling of their Estates, Tenure and Com-
mons,

mons, which were confirmed by Parliament, in the Third Year of the Reign of King *Charles* I.

In the late Reigns, however calumniated, there were many and great Applications made for Grants of some Members and Parts of these Lordships, which were always rejected, as too powerful a Trust for a Subject. If the Part were so, what shall the Grant of the Whole be?

History and Records tell us, that the Grants of these Lordships have been very fatal to either Prince or Patentees; the one either lost his Crown, or the other his Head. It is therefore dangerous meddling with such ominous Bounties.

I must likewise observe to you, that the Long Parliament in King *Charles* the Second's Reign, when they passed an Act for the Fee Farm Rents, excepted those within the Principality of *Wales*; which is a plain Intimation, that the Parliament thought them not alienable, or fitting to be aliened, but rather to be preserved for the Support of the Prince of *Wales*.

There is a great Duty lyes upon the Freeholders of these Lordships, upon the Creation of a Prince of *Wales*: They pay the Prince 800 *l.* for Mises, which is such a Duty, Service, or Tenure, that it is not to be severed from the Prince of *Wales*; and how this Tenure can be made recon-

cilable to this Noble Lord's Grant, will be a great Difficulty.

If we are to pay these Mises to this Noble Lord, upon this Grant, then he is, or is *quasi* a Prince of *Wales*; for this Duty was never paid to any other: But if it is to be paid to the Prince of *Wales*, and likewise to this Noble Lord, then we are doubly charged. But if it be to be paid to the Prince of *Wales*, when he has no Royalty left in that Dominion, and not to be paid to this Noble Lord, who by this Grant is to have the whole Lordships, it creates a Repugnancy in the Tenure of our Estates.

But I suppose this Grant of the Principality is a Fore-runner of the Honour too, and then I shall fancy we are returning to our Original Contract; for, as Story tells us, that we were first brought to entertain a Prince of *Wales*, by recommending him to us as one that did not understand the *English* Tongue, and our Forefathers thence inferred, that he must be our Countryman, and no Foreigner, and one that understood the *British* Language; how we were deceived therein is palpable.

I suppose this Lord doth not understand our Language, nor is it to be suppos'd, that he will come amongst us to learn it, nor shall we be fond of learning his.

But

But since I have minded you of our *Welch* Original Contract, which is of so long a Standing, I would not have you forget another Contract made not above Seven or Eight Years since, which is the Foundation of our present Government; I mean the Bill of Rights and Liberties, and settling the Succession of the Crown, which is so much forgotten in Discourse or Practice, that I have not heard it nam'd in Parliament, but once the last Parliament: And I find it as much forgotten in the Administration. I would gladly know from those who are better vers'd in Prerogative Learning than myself, Whether His Majesty can, by the Bill of Rights, without the Consent of Parliament, alien, or give away the Inheritance, or an absolute Fee of the Crown Lands? If he can, I would likewise know to what Purpose the Crown was settled for Life, with a Remainder in Succession, if a Tenant for Life of the Crown can grant away the Revenue of the Crown, and which is incident to the Crown? Or can the King have a larger Estate in the Revenue than he has in the Crown to which it belongs? Far be it from me to speak any thing in Derogation of His Majesty's Honour and Care of us!

It cannot be intended, that he shall know our Laws, who is a Stranger to us,

and we to him, no more than we know his Counfels, which I wifh we did; I mean thofe new Advifers. However, thofe of his Counfellors or Minifters, thofe whom we do know, and thofe thro' whofe Hands the Grant did pafs, by advifing the King to grant what by Law he could not, are guilty of the higheft Violation of the Laws and Liberties of *England*, ftrike at the Foundation of the Succeffion, and tear up the Bill of Rights and Liberties by the Roots: It was their Province and Duty to have acquainted the King with his Power and Intereft, that the ancient Revenue of the Crown is facred and unalienable in Time of War and the People's Neceffities.

By the Old Law, it was Part of the Coronation Oath of the Kings of *England*, not to alien the ancient Patrimony of the Crown, without the Confent of Parliament: But, as to thofe Oaths of Office, moft Kings have Court Cafuifts about them, to inform that they have Prerogative enough to difpenfe with them.

It has been the peculiar Care of Parliaments, in all Ages, to keep an even Balance betwixt King and People; and therefore, when the Crown was too liberal in their Bounties, the Parliament ufually refum'd thofe Grants, which was very frequent; for, from the Reign of *Henry*
the

the Third of *England*, to the Sixth Year of *Henry* the Eighth, there was one or more Bills of Resumption in every one of those Kings Reigns, save one of them. In the Time of *Henry* the Fifth, there was an Act of Resumption of all that was granted from the Prince of *Wales* in all that Principality; and yet those Acts were not look'd upon by those Kings (of whom some of them both good and great) any Lessening or Diminution to their Prerogatives, it being consider'd, that Kings have their Failings as well as other Men, being cloathed with frail Nature, and are apt to yield to the Importunities of their Flatterers and Favourites: Therefore it becomes necessary, that the Great Council of the Nation should interpose for the Interest of the King and People.

The Commoners of *England* always entertained an honourable Jealousy of their Princes, when they perceived their Expences at Home or Abroad, their Gifts and Boons to their Favourites to be too large and exorbitant; and have therefore, by their Petitions and dutiful Applications to the Crown, advis'd the Kings of *England* to retrench their Expences, and not to alien or give away the Revenues of the Crown, lest they should become burthensome to the People, and chargeable to the Commonwealth, and that they
would

would live upon their own Revenue, & *Tallagis Populi*. These were their just and frequent Ways, in elder Time, to repair the languishing Estate of the Crown.

And as we are an Island, and subject to Invasion, so the Parliaments of *England* were very watchful, that other Countries should not outdo them in Trade and naval Strength; that Foreigners should have no more Footing, or Strength, or Settlement in *England*, than was conducing to carry on the Trade and Commerce of the Nation; and whenever Princes entertain'd Foreigners as their Counsel, or chief Advisers, the People of *England* were restless and uneasy, till they were removed out of the King's Counsels, nay, out of the Kingdom. And Instances are many in History and Parliament Rolls, what Great Men and Foreigners (being Favourites) were banish'd the Land for procuring to themselves too large a Proportion of the Royal Revenue, especially in Time of War, and the People's Necessities.

As for Instance, in K. *Stephen's* Time, who usurped the Crown of *England* from *Maud* the Empress, and her Son, King *Henry* the Second, *William de Ipres*, a *Netherlander*, was brought over, with great Numbers of his Countrymen; to
which

which *William de Ipres* that King *de facto* gave an Earldom, and made him so great a Confident, that he was in all his Counsels, and obtain'd great Grants, not only for himself, but also for his Countrymen the *Netherlanders*, called then *Flemings*, who then swarmed so thick about that King's Court, that *Englishmen* were scarce known or regarded; at which the People were so enraged, that they importuned King *Henry* the Second, when he obtain'd the Right of his Crown, to seize on all which King *Stephen* had given the foreign Favourite and his Accomplices, and banished him, and his Friends the *Netherlanders*, from his Court and Kingdom.

The like Compliment was made by the People to King *Richard* the First, for the removing and banishing of the Duke of *Saxony*, his own Nephew, and his Sister's Son, being a Foreigner, and all his *German* Friends.

The same Address was made by the People to *Henry* the Third, to banish his Half Brethren (being Foreigners) and all their *Poitovian* Friends.

The same Address was made by the People to *Edward* the Second, to do so with the Lineage of *Gaveston* and all his *Gascoigners*; and did not *Edward* the Third do the same with his *Bobemian* Friends?

Henry

Henry the Fourth, and other following Princes took the same Method, upon the humble and hearty Petition of the People, sometimes in Parliament, and sometimes out; and, in these Cases, the Kings seized and took to themselves all the Revenues of the Crown that they had given them, and always sent those Foreigners to their own Countries.

For these Reasons given, in many of those Instances, the People of *England* disliked and opposed them, fearing both their Power and Counsels, and that they would become heavy and burthensome to the State, and that *England* was able to foster none but her own Children.

I must needs confess, that my Thoughts are strangely troubled with the Apprehension of our deplorable State. We are in a Confederacy in War, and some of those Confederates our Enemies in Trade, tho' planted amongst us, some in the King's Council, some in the Army, and the common Traders have possess'd themselves of the Out-skirts of the City. We find some or other of them Naturaliz'd, and others made Denizens. Every Parliament, we find, endeavours for a general Naturalization, and that warmly solicited from Court. We see our good Coin all gone, and our Confederates openly coining base Money, of *Dutch Alloy*, for us.

We

We see most Places of Power and Profit given to Foreigners: We see our Confederates in Conjunction with the *Scots* to ruin our *English* Trade: We see the Revenues of the Crown daily given to one or other, who make Sale of them, and transmit their Estates elsewhere: We do not find any of them buy Lands or Estates amongst us; but what they can get from us they secure in their own Country.

How can we hope for happy Days in *England*, when this Great Man, and the other (tho' Naturalized) are in the *English*, and also in the *Dutch* Counsels? If those Strangers, tho' now Confederates, should be of different Interests, as most plainly they are in Point of Trade; to which Interest is it to be supposed those Great Foreign Counsellors and Favourites would adhere? So that, I foresee, when we are reduc'd to extreme Poverty, as now we are very near it, we are to be supplanted by our Neighbours, and become a Colony to the *Dutch*.

I shall make no Remarks on this Great Man, for his Greatness makes us little, and will make the Crown both poor and precarious; and when God shall please to send us a Prince of *Wales*, he may have such a Present of a Crown made him, as a Pope did to King *John*, who was surname'd *Sansterre*, and by his Father *Henry*
the

the Second made Lord of *Ireland*, which Grant was confirmed by the Pope, who sent him a Crown of Peacocks Feathers, in Derision of his Power, and the Poverty of his Revenue.

I would have us to consider, we are *Englishmen*, and must, like good Patriots, stand by our Country, and not suffer it to become Tributary to Strangers: We have rejoic'd, that we have beat out of this Kingdom *Popery* and *Slavery*, and now do, with as great Joy, entertain *Socinianism* and *Poverty*; and yet we see our Properties daily given away, and our Liberties must soon follow.

Thus I have represented unto you the Nature of this Mighty Grant to this Noble Lord, the ill Consequence that must attend the Publick, and more particularly this County, by the passing of it; the Remedies that our Forefathers took to cure this mischievous Ill, were known.

I desire more Redress than Punishment. Therefore, I shall neither move for an Impeachment against this Noble Lord, nor the Banishment of him; but I shall beg that he may have no Power over us, nor we any Dependence upon him: Therefore I shall conclude my Motion, that an Address be made to His Majesty, to stop the Grant that is passing to the Earl of *Portland*, of the Lordships of *Denbigh*,
Brom-

Bromfield, and *Tale*, and other Lands in the Principality of *Wales*; and that the same be not Granted, but by Consent of Parliament.

Accordingly, that same Sessions there was an Address presented, begging that the Grant might be recall'd, which accordingly was done. This was in the Year 169⁴, and the *May* after the following Grant was made in Recompence for the Revenues of the Principality of *Wales*.

MAY 7. 1696.

A GRANT to *WILLIAM*,
Earl of *PORTLAND*, of the

Manor of *GRANTHAM* in the
County of *Lincoln*,

Honour of *PENRETH* in the
County of *Cumberland*,

Manor of *DRACKLOW* and
RUDNETH in the County of *Chester*,

Manor of *TERRINGTON* in
the County of *Norfolk*,

Manors


Manors of PARTINGTON,
BRISTOL, GARTH, HOM-
SEY, THWING, BURNISLEY,
and LEVEN in the County of *York*,

All Parcel of the ancient Revenue of
the Crown of ENGLAND, and of
the Manor of PAVENSEY in the
County of *Sussex*,

Parcel of the Duchy of LANCA-
STER, and of all the Lands, Tene-
ments, and Hereditaments thereunto be-
longing, to have and to hold the same to
the said Earl and his Heirs.

As of His Majesty's Manor of EAST-
GREENWICH in the County of
Kent, under the Rent of *L. 4 13 s. 4 d.*
payable at *Lady-Day* yearly. And such
Clauses, Powers and Proviso's are insert-
ed, as were directed by Warrant under
His Majesty's Royal Sign Manual.

There is likewise granted to the said
Earl of *Portland*, all the little Remain-
der of the Fee-Farm-Rents, worth to be
Sold, 24000 *l.* Given of mere Bounty,
23000 *l.*



A
S P E E C H

A G A I N S T

Continuing the Army, &c.

As it was

Spoken the 4th Day of *December*, 1717,
in the House of C O M M O N S.

By *William Shippen*, Esq;

Who was committed Prisoner to the
Tower, for some Passages in it.

to S I R,



Congratulate* *the Honourable*
Person below, on his being re-
stored to the good Opinion of
† *the Learned Gentleman*, who
spoke last. For it is not long
since he *complimented* (I will not say *flat-*
tered ANOTHER, at the Expence of that

General L——y.

† Sir F——.

D

Honour

Honourable Person, and most of the General Officers in this Kingdom.

But as to *the Question* before us; 'tis my Misfortune to differ from the *learned Gentleman* in *ALL* he hath *advanc'd*, which, when stripped of *some Excursions*, may be reduced to these *Two Propositions*.

THAT the only Danger of Continuing the ARMY is the Expence of it.

THAT we ought to comply with the Number of Forces propos'd, because it is demanded by the KING, who is the best Judge of our Necessities.

I do not object to the *first Reason*, that the *Phrase* is *ambiguous*, and that it is difficult to know what he means by the *Danger of the Expence*. But, if I understand him, the *Answer* is obvious. For though the *Expence* is doubtless a Matter highly deserving the Consideration of *this House*, whose *Business* and *Duty* it is to dispose of the *publick Money* with the utmost Frugality; yet it is by no means the *chief* or *only*, *Argument* against Keeping up *An Army in the time of Peace*. The *chief Argument*, with great Submission, is, That the *Civil* and *Military Power* cannot long *subsist* together; That a *Standing Army in time of Peace* will
neces-

necessarily impede the free Execution of the Laws of the Land. And 'tis therefore very extraordinary, that the *Expence* should be thought the only *Danger* (to use his own Terms) of a *Standing Army*, by a *Person*, whose *Profession* and *present Station* oblige him to make *those Laws* his *first Care*; and that it should be urged as such, in *this Place*, where so many *Millions* have been *cheerfully granted* for the *Defence* of *Them*.

The *second Reason* is no more *conclusive* than the *first*, as I hope to make appear in the *Sequel* of what I have to offer.

Gentlemen have insisted much on the great *Grace* and *Favour* shewn, in *Reducing the Army* since the *Beginning* of the *last Session*; and I presume not to say, that we were *deceived* into the *Vote* then given for maintaining THIRTY TWO THOUSAND MEN, because we always *proceed* with the utmost *Caution* and *Circumspection*, and because the *deep Designs* of the *SWEDISH PLOT*, which occasioned such *terrible Apprehensions* amongst us, have since been *fully discovered* to the *World*.

But however *wisely* it was then done, I hope never again to see, either the *same Number*, or near the *same Corps*, after some *artful Reductions*, continued in this

Nation in time of Peace, on any *Pretence*, on any *Apprehensions* whatsoever.

I will not trouble you, *Sir*, with my *Remarks* on the *Fallacy* of those *Reductions*. They have been sufficiently *expos'd* by * a *Gentleman*, who is better inform'd of the *Secret* of that *Affair*, and who, (I am glad to find) when he is contending for the Service of his Country, is no more afraid than myself, of being called a *Jacobite*, by those who want other *Arguments* to support their *Debates*.

Our *present Consideration* is, Whether there are any *Reasons* to induce us, as our *Circumstances* now stand, to keep up ABOVE SIXTEEN THOUSAND MEN, with *Officers* for almost double that *Number*; and Whether, if we should consent to keep them up, we should act (as *His Majesty* desires we should) agreeable to the *Constitution* of these *Kingdoms*, and consequently to the *Principles* on which his *Government* is founded?

Now, in *Virtue* of that *Freedom of Speech* we are all entitled to, I beg Leave to declare my *Opinion*, That the *Keeping up the Number proposed*, is so far from being *necessary* to our *Protection*, that it will be *inconsistent* with our *Safety*, and an *excessive Burthen* to *His Majesty's good Subjects*. Nor do I think it

* Mr. W———.

possible

possible any *Arguments* can be *invented* (none I am sure have been yet offered) to incline an *House of Commons* at *this time*, when we are in a *profound Tranquillity*, some *Domestick Feuds* excepted, to submit to *that*, which every *Member*, every *Lover of Liberty*, must own, *abstractedly considered*, to be a *Grievance*, and such an *One*, as ought never to be submitted to, but in that most *desperate and deplorable Circumstance*, where it is to be chosen as the *less Evil*.

I know *these Assertions* interfere with what is laid down in the *second Paragraph* of *His Majesty's SPEECH*. But we are to consider *that Speech*, as the *Composition and Advice* of *his Ministry*, and are therefore at *Liberty* to debate every *Proposition* in it; especially * *Those, which seem rather calculated for the Meridian of GERMANY, than of GREAT-BRITAIN*.

'Tis the *Only Infelicity* of *His Majesty's Reign*, That * *He is unacquainted with our Language and Constitution*; and 'tis therefore the more incumbent on his *British Ministers* to inform him, That our *Government* does not stand on the *same Foundations* with *his German Dominions*,

* These were the two Passages which gave Offence, and for which He was committed to the *Tower*.

which, by *Reason of their Situation and the Nature of their Constitution*, are obliged to keep up *Armies in Time of Peace*. Nor is it in the least to be wonder'd at, That *His Majesty*, who hath spent the *earlier Part of his Life in those Dominions*, should think SIXTEEN, or even THIRTY TWO, THOUSAND MEN might be *continued* in so rich and powerful a Nation, as *this* is, without being a *Burthen* to it. But when he shall come to understand, That *the smaller Number*, in *Time of Peace*, would be destructive to *that Security and Ease of his People*, for which he *expresses* so tender a Regard; he will doubtless be convinc'd, That *those* act most conformably to *their Duty*, and *his Interest*, who (as *true Subjects of Great Britain*) are against continuing more TROOPS, than have been *usually thought and found sufficient*, in the *same Situation of Affairs*, for the *Support of the Crown and the Safety of the Kingdom*.

I am therefore at a Loss, to conceive how Gentlemen can persuade themselves, That the *Complying with this extraordinary Demand* would promote *His Majesty's Service*. For it supposes not only a *Distrust*, but a *Weakness in the Government*; as if neither *the Affections of the People at Home*, nor *the Treaties of our Allies*

Allies Abroad, were to be depended on: Which is a Thought so *injurious*, so *contradictory* to some *solemn Assurances* from the *Throne*, that no one will *presume* to advance it openly in *this House*, or *elsewhere*; and yet it is all, in my humble Apprehension, *included* in *this Motion*. Nothing, indeed, can *alienate* the *Hearts* of the *People* from *His Majesty*; but such *Attempts* have formerly proved *fatal* to *Princes* of *less consummate Wisdom* and *Virtue*. Nor are we to imagine, That the *same Grievance* is not *equally mischievous* in the *Reign* of a *good Prince*, as of a *bad One*. 'Tis sometimes more so, because *less expected*, and *less guarded* against.

Surely *His Majesty* will have no just Cause to doubt the *Continuance* of that *Zeal* for the *Good* of our *Country*, which (he is pleased to say) hath been so *eminently conspicuous* in every *Session* of this *Parliament*, if we make the *Fate* of other *Nations* a *Document* to ourselves on this *Occasion*; if we think, That the *Keeping up* a *larger Number* of *Forces*, than is *absolutely necessary*, too *dangerous* an *Experiment* to be often repeated.

Let *Gentlemen* look round *Europe*, and they will find, That some of the *freest* and *bravest People* in it have, by *this very Method*, lost their *Liberties*. They will find, That the *Civil Power* was from

Time to Time *drawn in*, by pretended *Exigencies*, to allow and maintain an *armed Force in Peace*; which, as they at *first thought*, and were *instructed to believe*, was intended, to add *Strength* to their *Authority*, to secure them in the Possession of *their Religious and Political Rights*, to watch the *ambitious Designs* of their *Neighbour Nations*, and to *preserve the Balance of Power*. GLORIOUS INTENTIONS, if they had prov'd REAL! But, though they used all *possible Precaution*, though they made it the *Condition of their Establishment*, That the *Forces* should be *disbanded*, when the *extraordinary Occasion*, for which they were raised, *ceased*; yet they perceived too late, That *their Condition* was not *binding*, That they had erected a *Power superior to themselves*, That the *Soldiery*, when they had *tasted the Sweets of Authority*, would not part with it, and, That EVEN THEIR PRINCES (after these *temporary Concessions* made to them) began to think, that *ruling by an Army* was a more easy, a more *compendious*, Way of *Government*, than *acting under the Restraints and Limitations of the Laws of their Country*. And now they wear THE CHAINS, which they put round their own Necks, and lament the Loss of that *FREEDOM*, which they

they *unhappily* consented to *destroy*, and which could never have been *destroyed* without their *Consent*.

But there is no need of fetching Arguments, on *this Subject*, from *foreign Nations*. Our *own* is too well acquainted with *the Effects* of *continuing an armed Force in Peace*, not to apprehend every Thing from it, be the *Pretence* never so *specious*.

'Twould be *mispending* our Time, to recount the *Mischiefs*, which have *from hence* happened to *this Nation*, and I will not run back to *former Reigns*. But I cannot forbear observing (what * *my very good Friend* near me hath already hinted) that it was *the great Grievance* complained of in the *Bill of Rights*, and was *that*, from which the *Revolution* was to *deliver* us. KING WILLIAM himself, after *the Peace* of *Ryswick*, could not obtain above TEN THOUSAND MEN, though he had then *a more enterprizing*, and *a more powerful*, Prince to deal with, than any now in this Part of the World. And the *Proceeding* of that *House of Commons* must be ever justify'd by those, who have *the least Concern* for our *Constitution*, notwithstanding some *ungrounded Insinuations*, that it involved us in *a long and ex-*

* Mr. Sn——ll.

penfive War. Besides, it is every Year declared in the *Act of Mutiny and Desertion*, That the Keeping up a *Standing Army in Time of Peace* is against *Law*; and as the *Freeing* us from it, was one of the *Ends* of the *Revolution*, so no doubt the *Preserving* us for ever from any *Attempt* of the like *Nature*, was one of THOSE INNUMERABLE GLORIOUS ADVANTAGES propos'd by the ACT OF SUCCESSION.

But it hath been urged, that *the Consent of Parliament* reconciles all, and that *Forces so continued* are not to be accounted a *standing Army*, because they are intended to keep out a *standing Army*; which (with the * *noble Lord's* Leave, who makes the *Distinction*) is a *Notion too fine, too Chimerical*, to be maintain'd.

I know indeed it is explained both in the *Bill of Rights*, and in the *Act of Mutiny and Desertion*, that the keeping up a *standing Army in Time of Peace* is *illegal* only, if done without *Consent of Parliament*. Now this in no Sort weakens the *Argument*, as to the *Inconvenience* and *Oppression*, of which I am speaking. For, tho' *the Parliament*, in these *Declaratory Laws*, seems to put in its *Claim* only against the *Incroachments* of


* Lord M——th;

the *Crown*, from whence it suppos'd *such Oppressions* were more likely to come, than from *the Representatives of the People*; yet *the Consent of Parliament* cannot alter the *Nature of Things*, cannot hinder the *same Causes* from Producing the *same Effects*. An *Army*, tho' kept up by *Consent of Parliament*, will, like other *Armies*, soon know its own Strength, will in Probability pursue the *Dictates of Self-Preservation*, and rather choose to dissolve that *Authority* with which it is incompatible, than tamely submit to its own *Dissolution*. An *Army*, tho' kept up by *Consent of Parliament*, if it hath no *Enemies Abroad*, will be apt to make *Depredations at Home*; and I wish there hath not been something of *that Kind* done *this last Year*: I wish we have no *Complaints*, from some of our own most considerable *Parliamentary Corporations*, of *Soldiers demanding free Quarter*, and *Insulting the Chief Magistrates* for Exerting the Power we have lodged with them, and endeavouring to redress the *Grievances of the poor Inn-keepers and Inhabitants*. Nay, the *Consent of Parliament* is so far from altering the *Nature and Genius of Armies*, that a *Parliament-Army* (consisting of about the *Number now demanded*) once committed greater *Outrages*, and gave a deeper *Wound* to
the

the *Constitution*, than all the *Armies* of the *Crown* have ever done ; and **THAT ARMY** was *the Creature of A PARLIAMENT*, which had *establish'd itself*. But, if we were to admit, for *Argument's sake*, That *the Consent of Parliament* could make *Armies* more *tame* and *ductile*, than they would *otherwise* be ; I think however, it would not be *advisable* for a *Parliament*, that *intends to act* rationally, and *agreeably*, either to *the Principles on which His Majesty's Government*, or its own *Power*, is *founded*, to familiarize a *Military Force* to this *Free Nation*. For the very *Name* and *Terror* of it, would (without *Oppression*) *awe* and *subdue* the *Spirits* of the *People*, *extinguish* their *Love of Liberty*, and *beget* a mean and abject *Acquiescence in Slavery*.

S I R,

We have already *suspended Some Laws*, and *repealed Others*, to comply with the *Necessities of the Administration*. But pray let us not go further, let us not go on to *continue the Army*, or the *greatest Part of it* : For so long as it is *continued*, so long is the *whole Constitution suspended*, or at least, in *the Mercy* of those, whom we *arm against* it.



A

S P E E C H

A G A I N S T

Continuing the Army, &c.

As it was

Spoken the 5th Day of December, 1717.

I N T H E

House of COMMONS,

By E—— Jefferies, Esq;

S I R,



Shall not waste the Time of the Committee in making an *Apology* for meddling in this *Question*; since I apprehend whatever I can yet call my own, to be at Stake in the Event of it. Whether the *Army*

Army shall be disbanded, or continued, in Time of Peace? Whether we shall be governed by the Magistrate, or the Soldier? or, Whether we shall be bond or free? are, in my Opinion, Questions of the same Import.

I think myself *justify'd* in saying *this*, from the *Examples* of most *Countries* in *Europe*. They were *once free*, but if it be inquir'd, how, from a STATE OF FREEDOM they *sunk* into *SLAVERY*, it will appear, That their *common Ruin* has *proceeded* from the *Continuance* of *Regular Troops* in *Pay*, after the *Occasion*, for which they were *rais'd*, was over.

That *this Island* has retain'd its *FREEDOM* longer, than the *Countries* on the *Continent*, has been imputed to its *Situation*; which not being so much *exposed* to the *Incurfions* of its *Neighbours*, there was not the *like Pretence* for Keeping up *Regular Troops*. But the *Preservation* of our *Liberties* to this *Time*, is, in my *Opinion*, rather to be *ascribed* to the due *Sense* our *Forefathers* had of the *Danger* the *Publick* underwent from *intrusting Princes* with a *standing Force* in *Time of Peace*. And also to the *Measure* observed by the *House of Commons*, in giving such *Supplies* *Only*, as enabled the *Prince* to live in the full *Enjoyment* of his *Prerogative*, without

out putting it into his Power to *affect* the *Liberties* of the *Subject*.

From the *first credible Account* of Things in *this Kingdom*, down to *King Charles the Second's Time*, I can find no *Instance*, where the *Crown* kept up *Regular Troops* in *Time of Peace*, that of *Richard the Second* excepted.

He lived in a *tempestuous Age*; he had *Wars abroad*, and *Commutations at home*. THE FIRST REBELLION, headed by *WATT TYLER*, was composed without *Shedding the Blood* of any one of the *Rebels*, save *TYLER HIMSELF*: The *King* gave them *good Words*; they laid down *their Arms*, went *home*, and were all *pardon'd*. ANOTHER REBELLION, of the *Men of KENT and ESSEX*, broke out, which occasion'd the *King's Raising an Army of Forty Thousand Men*. The *Rebels* apply'd by *Petition* to have their *Liberties and Franchises* allow'd them. But the *King* spoke to *these* in a *different Style*; he told them, *SLAVES THEY WERE, AND SLAVES THEY SHOULD BE*. *Five Hundred* of them were cut to *Pieces* in the *Field*, and *Fifteen Hundred* of them were afterward *executed* in cold *Blood*.

This *Severity* aw'd the *Nation* for *awhile*. But, the *Discontent of the People* after-

afterwards *increasing*, about the twentieth Year of his Reign a *Parliament* was call'd, and, to use the *Historian's* Words, lest I should offend any tender Ear, " *All Endeavours were used to procure such a Parliament as would concur with the King's Designs.* " Before they met, *Forces* were rais'd " to attend and guard the *Parliament*; which might at the same *Time* be an *Awe* upon any *Refractory Members.* " Touching the *Numbers* of which this *Army* consisted, *History* is silent: This only we are given to know, that *Four thousand* of them were *ARCHERS*, and that *many* of them were *CHESHIRE-MEN*. It is not to the present *Purpose* to go over the *Extravagancies* of that *Parliament*.

Into what a *State* Things were brought by that *King's Conduct*, appears from an *Observation* made by the same *Historian*, who says, " *That the King having thus establish'd his Power, and put himself beyond all Opposition, thought himself secure, and an absolute Prince.* But " it being laid upon such a *Foundation*, as " *begat many Discontents among the People, all the Fabrick prov'd weak,* " *and was soon follow'd with lamentable Ruin.* " When that *King's Affairs* grew desperate, an *Oath* was requir'd from the *Duke of Lancaster*, afterwards *Henry the Fourth*,

Fourth, that he should cause the King to send home the *CHESHIRE-GUARD*, which was accordingly done.

I observe in the *Debate*, it has been taken for granted, That the *Crown of England* has a Right to a *Number of Regular Troops*, under the *Denomination* of GUARDS. This is a *Notion* I can by no means give into. It was not so *antiquo*.

The *first Guards* we hear of (the *Yeomen of the Guard*, which were constituted by *Henry the Seventh*, being of another Kind) were in *Charles the Second's Time*. That *Prince*, immediately after his *Restoration*, got together a *small Number of Guards*, which at first seem'd to be meant only to add to the *Equipage and Splendor* of the *Court*. But it soon appear'd, that he had *other Views*: The *Guards*, by adding *Men to Troops and Companies*, and *Troops and Companies to Regiments*, were *insensibly increased*; so that in the Year 1677, they were got up to FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY MEN. Few *Sessions* pass'd, but they were taken Notice of in the *House of Commons*, and though *Money* was not ask'd of *Parliament* for their *Support*, yet they occasioned a general *Uneasiness*.

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About

About that Time, there was a *Prospect* of a *War* with *France*, on which Pretence an *Army* was rais'd. But, the *War* not proceeding, an Act pass'd, which gave the King SIX HUNDRED AND NINETEEN THOUSAND, THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY EIGHT POUNDS, for *disbanding* the *Army*. When the *Parliament* met again, they were told from the *Throne*, " That the Forces were still
 " kept on Foot for the Preservation of our
 " Neighbours, who otherwise had absolutely despaired ; and for preserving
 " what was left in Flanders; and, that
 " the King was confident no Body would
 " repine at the Employing that Money,
 " which was rais'd for the Disbanding
 " of the Army, for the Continuance of it.

This did not satisfy the *House*, and they came to a Resolution, " That it was necessary for the Safety of his Majesty's
 " Person, and preserving the Peace of the
 " Government, That all Forces raised
 " since the Twenty ninth of September
 " 1677, should be disbanded." Whereupon that *Parliament*, which went under the Name of the PENSIONER-PARLIAMENT, was dissolved.

The new *Parliament*, which met on the First of *March* following, had the same Apprehensions of *Regular Troops*. Money was given to *disband* them, and the

the *Act* directed, That it should be paid into the *Chamber of London*, and *Commissioners* of *their own* were appointed to see it apply'd to *that Use*. Whatever *Diffidence* of the *King* this might imply, I do not find that ANY MEMBER lost his LIBERTY for FREEDOM OF SPEECH on that Occasion. The Opinion that Parliament had of a *Standing Army* appears in the *Resolution* they came to, "*That the Continuance of Standing Forces in this Nation, other than the Militia, was illegal, and a great Grievance and Vexation to the People.*"

I shall now take Leave to consider the Arguments advanced for continuing SIXTEENTH THOUSAND, THREE HUNDRED, FORTY SEVEN MEN, for the ensuing Year.

It is said,

T H A T there is a Disaffected Party in the Kingdom, which makes an Army necessary.

If this Argument will prevail, 'tis strange it has not prevail'd for *Six Hundred Years* past; since no *Period* within that Time can be assign'd, wherein this Argument was not as strong, as in the *present*.

During the *long Controversy* between the *Houses of York and Lancaster* touching the *Right of Succession*, (in which each

Side had its *Turn* of being *Uppermost*) one would think, it should have been natural for the *prevailing Party*, in order to their Security, to have insisted on the *Continuance* of their *Regular Troops*, at least for a Time. There was A PRETENDER to the *Crown*, who had a *strong Party* in the Nation, and the Government was insecure till the Spirit of *Rebellion* was *suppress'd*. It might then, with an *Appearance* of *Reason*, have been insisted on, That the *Taxes* on the *Disaffected* should be *increas'd*, that those, who occasion'd the *Expence*, should bear the *Burthen*, till the *Danger* was over.

Why this *sort of Reasoning* did not then prevail, is obvious. They saw it was *unsafe* to trust any *Prince*, even ONE OF THEIR OWN SETTING UP, with *such a Power*, which, if ill apply'd, might *enslave* them.

Another *Period* of Time I shall take Notice of is, that of *Queen Elizabeth's Reign*. The *Disaffection* to Her in the Beginning of it was *great*, occasion'd by the *Reformation in Religion*, and the *Application* of *Ecclesiastical Revenues* to *Secular Uses*. Many *Plots* there were against her Life. SPAIN (one of the *greatest Powers* in *Europe* at that Time) attempted an *INVASION*, and a more proper *Juncture* could not have happen'd, wherein

wherein to have ask'd for an *Army*. But, instead of that, the *greatest Part* of the *Forces* then got together, to *oppose* the *INVASION*, consisted of *MILITIA*, and as soon as the *ARMADA* was *scattered*, the *Army* was *disbanded*: That *Queen* being sensible, that the true, the only, *Support* of the *Crown*, was the *Good-will* and *Affections* of the *People*.

Another Argument brought for the *Continuance* of the *Army* is,

THAT the *Denying* it does *insinuate* a *Distrust* of his *Majesty*.

How *disingenuous* and *Unparliamentary* a *Way* of *Arguing* this is, let *Gentlemen* judge. For, to draw *that sacred Name* into a *Debate*, must put every *Body* to *Pain*, who takes the *other Side* of the *Question*, in *Regard* it may be construed, that the *stronger* the *Argument* is, the *greater* is the *Distrust*.

But *this Reasoning*, in my *Opinion*, turns quite *another Way*, and instead of implying a *Distrust*, argues the *greatest Regard* to the *Safety* of *His Majesty's* *Person* and *Government*. Who can answer for the *Caprice* of an *Army*, when once *establish'd*?

Although no *Man* living has a greater *Esteem* than my self for *those honourable*

Gentlemen, who have with so much Bravery serv'd their Country in a *Military Way*, nor shall any Man go further in *re-warding* their *Services*; yet the common *Experience* of Mankind *demonstrates*, That it is not reasonable to expect an *Army* should be always in the *same Humour*. AUGUSTUS CÆSAR liv'd in great *Peace* and *Security* with the PRÆTORIAN BANDS, which had put an End to the ROMAN LIBERTIES. But the *Case* was *different* with his *Successors*. For of *Twenty Six Emperors*, no less than *Sixteen* were *pull'd to pieces* by their *own Soldiers*. Did not the *Army* here in *England*, in the TIMES OF USURPATION, if I may be allow'd to name them, in a short Space, change the *Government* into *Ten* several *Forms*? What *Treatment* did the *Parliament*, who had *rais'd* and *supported* them, meet with from them? They *beset* the *House*, *repuls'd* *Many Members* who would have come in, *Others* they *dragged out* even by the *Legs*, and at length they were *All* turned out, and the *Doors* shut up. I say this with the *more Assurance*, having had the *Account* from an *Honourable Person*, lately *dead*, who was an *Eye-witness* of it. *This Army*, 'tis true, (which consisted of about SEVENTEEN THOUSAND MEN) afterwards brought in *King Charles*
the

the Second. But *that Prince* soon *disbanded* them, being well aware, that the *same Army*, which brought him in, should their Minds change, might again turn him out.

This *Objection*, drawn from a *Distrust* of his *Majesty*, deserves another Name. 'Tis an *honest*, 'tis a *reasonable*, *Jealousy* of the *growing Power* of the *Crown*, which those, that went before us, always *avow'd*. May it not with Parity of Reason be said, That because I will not *consent*, that the *King* shall by his *Proclamation* raise *Money* without *Parliament*, that this is a *Distrust* of his *Majesty*? Because I will not *consent* to give up *Magna Charta*, and accept of a *new Patent* at Pleasure, may not this likewise be call'd a *Distrust* of his *Majesty*? But, *suppose* from an Opinion of the *Virtue* of the *Troops*; from an Opinion, that *Men in Power* will not make an *ill Use* of it; that *those*, who may be *Masters*, will choose to continue *Servants*; that *Men* under the *same Circumstances* will not do the *same Things*; and that we should *consent*, for *ourselves*, to *deposit* our *Liberties* in *their Hands* for a while; will any one say, that we have an Authority also to *consent* on the Behalf of *those* we *Represent*? A *Sum of Money*, a *Jewel*, or other *valuable Thing*, is committed to *my Care*; I, without the *Owner's*

E 4

Consent,

Consent, leave it in the *Possession* of another; although the Person with whom I left it, does not actually *embezzle* the *Money*, or *detain* the *Jewel*, yet do I break my *Trust*, by putting it into his *Power* so to do.

It is *self-evident*, that by keeping up *such a Number of Forces*, who may, when they are disposed, controul the *Power* of the *Civil Magistrate*, that the *Strength* and *Security* of our *Constitution* is at an *End*, and that we have no *other Rule* of *Government* left, than *Will* and *Pleasure*. The *Notion* I have of *SLAVERY* is the being subjected to the *Will* of another; and notwithstanding the *Rod* be not always on my *Back*, or the *Dragoon* in my *House*; yet, if it is not in my *Power* to *prevent* its being so, I am no longer *free*. After *AUGUSTUS* had established his *EIGHT THOUSAND REGULAR TROOPS*, the *Roman Constitution* was as much at an *End*, as it was in *NERO's* Time. Although the *TYRANNY* was not by *AUGUSTUS* exercis'd with the *like Severity* it was by his *Successors*; yet, from the Time his *Power* became *irresistible*, the *ROMANS* were *Slaves*.


Another Argument us'd for *this Number of Troops* is,

THAT

THAT there are no Thoughts of Establishing them, but only Continuing them for a Year.

If the *Notion* be true, which no Gentleman in the Debate has deny'd, That the Number of disciplin'd Men now contended for, are sufficient to dictate to the greatest Number undisciplin'd; I desire to know who shall dare to bid them go Home? 'Tis said indeed the *Parliament* will not provide for them: Why may not they then, as others in their Circumstances have done, PROVIDE FOR THEMSELVES? Is it reasonable to think, that Men will starve with Swords in their Hands?

I am sensible, that I have too much trespassed on Gentlemens Patience. I shall say no more, but that Bodies Political, as well as natural, have their Periods: GOVERNMENTS must die, as well as Men; Ours is grown old and crazy, and though She has surviv'd her Neighbours, yet I fear her DAY approaches.



A

S P E E C H

A G A I N S T

Continuing the Army, &c.

As it was

Spoken the 7th Day of December, 1717.

I N T H E

House of COMMONS,

By Sir *Tho. Hanmer*, Bart.

S I R,



Cannot forbear *troubling* you
with a *few Words* upon *this*
Subject, tho' I can neither flat-
ter myself with the Hopes of
convincing *any One*, nor pre-
tend to be able to offer *any Thing* to your
Consideration, which has not in a *better*
Manner

Manner been urged already. But I am truly concern'd for the *Mischiefs*, which I think we are giving Way to; and if I cannot *prevent* them, it will be a *Satisfaction* to me at least to *protest* against them.

All Gentlemen, who have spoke in this Debate, have, for their *different Opinions*, agreed in *one Thing*, to press very much the *Argument of Danger*; and the only *Question* is, on *which Side* the *Danger* lies; whether to the *Government* without a *MILITARY FORCE* to support it, or to the *Constitution* and *Liberties of Great-Britain* from that *MILITARY FORCE*, if it be allow'd to continue in it.

As to the *Dangers*, which threaten the *Government*, I think I am not willing to overlook them. But I hope we may be *excus'd*, if we cannot be *convinc'd* of *Dangers*, which no Man, that I hear, pretends to *explain* to us.

Abroad, the *State and Circumstances of Europe* happen to be such, that I think it is hard to suppose a Time possible, when there shall be *less Appearance*, or *Apprehension*, of any *immediate Disturbance* to *this Kingdom*. The *three great Powers*, those which are *most considerable* in themselves, and of *nearest Concern* to us, I mean, the *Empire, France and Holland*,
are

are so far from being at any *Enmity* with us, that they are all of them *our fast Friends* and *Allies*; at least we are told so, and hear very often a great deal of *boasting* upon that *Subject*, whenever the *Administration of the Government* is to be *extoll'd*, and the *Merits* of it are to be set forth to us. Upon *those Occasions* we hear of nothing, but the *wise and useful Treaties*, which have been made; the *great Influence*, which we have acquir'd in *foreign Courts and Councils*; and the *solid Foundations*, which are laid for our *Security*. But, when in *Consequence* of these *great Things*, we come to talk of *reducing Forces*; then I observe the *Language* is quite *turn'd the other Way*; then we are in the *weakest and most insecure Condition* imaginable; there is no *Dependence* upon any Thing, and we must even be thought *disaffected* to the *Government*, if we will not believe, that we are *surrounded* on *all Sides* with the *greatest Dangers*.

But, in the midst of these *Contrarieties* and *Contradictions*, I think we need not be at any Loss what our *Conduct* ought to be, if we will but have *Regard* to those *plain Rules* and *Maxims*, which have always been observ'd in the *like Cases* with that which is now before us.

It would certainly be an endless Thing, for an *House of Commons* to enter into the

SECRETS OF STATE, and to debate upon the *different Views*, and *Interests*, and *Intrigues* of *foreign Courts*; what *Jealousies* are among them, and what *Treaties* are on foot to *reconcile* them. If we take *such Things* into our *Considerations*, to guide us in *Questions* concerning our *own Guards and Garrisons* here at home, we shall be in a *Labyrinth* indeed, and must be compell'd at last to put an *absolute Trust* in the *Government*; because *they* only *know* the *Truth* of *such Matters*, and from *them* we must be content to receive whatsoever *Account* *they* think fit to give us of them. But the only Thing *proper* for us to look to is, what is *plain* and *obvious* to the *Sense* of all Mankind, I mean, *When are the Times of present Peace*. There need no *Refinements of Politicks* to know that; and I will venture to say, that during *such Times of Peace*, no *remote Fears*, no *Arguments* drawn from *Contingencies* of what may be hereafter, have ever yet brought this Nation into a *Concession* so *fatal* to *Liberty*, as the *Keeping up of Standing Forces*, when there is no other *Employment* for them, but to *insult* and *oppress* their *Fellow-Subjects*. I say, there has hitherto been no *Precedent* of that kind, and the *Misfortune* of this Case is, there will need but *One Precedent* in it; *One wrong Step* taken
in

in *this Particular* may put an End to all your CLAIMS OF RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES.

And, on the other Hand, I beg it may not be taken for granted, that, if we *dismiss* our *Soldiers*, we shall therefore leave ourselves *naked*, and *void of all Protection* against any *sudden Danger*, that may arise. No Sir, *Providence* has given us the *best Protection*, if we do not foolishly throw away the Benefit of it. Our *Situation*, that is our *natural Protection*, Our *Fleet* is our *Protection*; and, if we could ever be so happy, as to see it rightly pursued, A GOOD AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KING AND PEOPLE, uniting and acting together in ONE NATIONAL INTEREST, would be such a *Protection*, as none of our *Enemies* would ever hope to break through.

It is a very melancholy Thing to me to hear any *other Notions* of Government advanced here; and that *his Majesty*, either from his *private* or his *General Council*, should ever, upon *this Subject*, have any Thing *inculcated* to him, but this great Truth, That the TRUE AND ONLY SUPPORT OF AN ENGLISH PRINCE DOES, AND OUGHT TO CONSIST IN THE AFFECTIONS OF HIS PEOPLE. It is *That* should strengthen

strengthen his Hands ; it is That should give Him Credit and Authority in the Eyes of other Nations ; and to think of doing of it by keeping up a Number of Land Forces here at Home, such a Number, as can have any Awe or Influence over the great Powers on the Continent, is, I think, one of the wildest Imaginations, that ever entered into the Heart of Man. The only Strength of this Nation must always consist in the Riches of it ; Riches must be the Fruits of Publick Liberty ; and the People can neither acquire Riches, nor the King have the Use of them, but by a Government founded in their Inclinations and Affections.

If this be true, then of Consequence it follows, That *whoever* advises his Majesty to aim at any *additional Security* to himself from a *Standing Army*, instead of *increasing his Strength*, does really *diminish* it, and *undermine his true Support*, by robbing him of the *Hearts of his Subjects*. For this I take for granted, that as there are but *two Ways of Governing*, the one by *Force*, and the other by the *Affections of the People governed*, it is impossible for any *Prince* to have them *both*. He must choose *which* of the *two* he will stick to ; for he can have but *one*. If he is *Master of their Affections*, he stands in no need of *Force* ; and if he will make *Use of Force*,
it

it is in vain for him to *expect* their *Affections*. For *it is not* in *Nature*, and it can never be brought to pass, that Men can *love* a *Government*, under which they are *loaded with heavy Taxes*, and pay a *considerable Part* of their *Estates* to maintain an *Army*, which *insults* them in the Possession of the *Rest*, and can turn them out of the *Whole*, whenever they *please*.

With Submission therefore the *Argument* is taken by the *wrong End*, when it is said, There are *great Animosities* in the Kingdom, the *People* are *disaffected*, and upon *that Account*, there is a *Necessity* of *keeping up an Army*. It concludes much *righter the other Way*; that is, *Dismiss your Army*, and give no *other Cause of Suspicion*, that *any Part* of the *Constitution* is to be *invaded*, and the *People* will be *well-affected*. Upon any other foot, than this, *What MINISTER* will ever care, whether he does *right* or *wrong*? it is not his Concern, whether the *People* are *easy* or *uneasy*; his *Army* is his *Dependence*: Nay, and the more, by his *wicked Counsels*, he *exasperates* and *enrages* the *People*, the *stronger* he makes his *Pretence* for maintaining and increasing *that Army*, which *supports* him.

What I have said, I confess, goes upon a *Supposition*, that the *Numbers* contain'd in the *Estimate*, and in the *Question* before you,

you, do make an *Army formidable* enough; and *able to enslave this Nation*; of which indeed there remains no Doubt with me. In the *Manner* those *Forces* are *constituted*, I think, a *Prince*, who would *wish* to be *arbitrary*, could *desire no more*; and if he had all the *Power* in his Hands, I think, for his *own sake*, he would *keep no more*.

Of *what Nature* the *Reductions* have been, *other Gentlemen* have so fully *explain'd*, and I believe it so *generally understood*, that it will be needless for me to dwell upon it. But the *Short* of the *Case* is this, That, out of **THIRTY TWO THOUSAND MEN**, *thirteen Regiments* only have been *disbanded*, which do not amount to more than *five or six Thousand*, besides a *few Invalids*, which were taken from the *Establishment of the Army*, and put upon the *Establishment of the Hospital*. So that there are the *Corps* now *subsisting* of more than **TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND MEN**, which *Corps* may be filled up to their *entire Complement*, whensoever the *Government* pleases, and that even without any *Noise*, or *Notice* taken. For the *Case* is very *different in that respect*, where the *Regiments* are *few*, and those kept *complete*. There, if the *Numbers allowed by Act of Parliament* are *exceeded*, it must be by


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raising

raising *new Regiments*, which is easily seen and known. But where the *Corps* are kept up with only a *few Men* in them, and some *Recruits* will always be necessary for them, there, if the *Government* is *willing* to be at the *Charge*, they may keep the *Numbers* up to what they please, and it is impossible to know when the *Parliamentary Standard* is exceeded, and when not. Thus therefore stands our *Account*. In the *first Place*, the *Publick* is to pay EIGHTEEN THOUSAND MEN; in the *next Place* the *Number of effective Men* is to be SIXTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN; and if *those* are not *sufficient* to exercise *Dominion* over us; yet, in the *manner* they are kept together, they are *equivalent* to TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND MEN; the *Charge* is *inconsiderably less*, and the *Terror*, which is the *main Thing*, is not all abated.

For the taking this *dangerous Step*, the only *Justification* I hear *Gentlemen* offer for themselves, the only *Shelter* they fly to, is the *great Confidence*, which is to be reposed in *his Majesty's just and gracious Intentions*: Of these I will entertain no *Doubt*; I believe *his Majesty* is too good to be *suspected* of any *arbitrary Designs*. But yet there is a *general Suspicion*, which I will

I will never be *ashamed* or *afraid* to own; because it is a *Suspicion* interwoven in our *Constitution*; it is a *Suspicion*, upon which our *Laws*, our *Parliament*, and every *Part* of our *Government* is founded; which is, That *too much Power* lodged in the *Crown*, (*abstracting* from the *Person* that wears it) will at some *Time* or other be *abused* in the *Exercise* of it, and can never long *consist* with the *natural Rights* and *Liberties* of Mankind. And therefore, *whatever Opinions* we have of *his Majesty's Goodness*, and *how much* soever he *deserves* them, We should still consider, that in *this Place* we are under a *distinct Duty* to our *Country*, and by *that Duty* we should be as *incapable* of giving up such an *unwarrantable Trust*, as *his Majesty*. I am *perswaded*, would be *incapable* of *abusing* it, if he had it in his *Hands*. *Those* we *represent* will *expect*, and they *ought* to *expect*, from us, that they should not only continue to enjoy *what belongs* to them, as *ENGLISHMEN*; but that they should hold it still by the *same Tenure*. Their *Estates*, their *Lives*, and their *Liberties* they have hitherto *possess'd*, as their *Rights*, and it would be a very great and a *sad Change*, and such as shall never have my *Consent* along with it, to make them only *Tenants at Will* for them.



T H E

REASONS

Given by the Lords who Protested
against the BILL for *Punishing*
Mutiny, &c.

Die Jovis, 20^o February, 1717.

*The Question was put, That it be an In-
struction to the Committee of the whole
House, to whom the Bill, Entitled, An
Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion,
and for the better Payment of the Army
and their Quarters, stands committed ;
That they do provide, that no Punish-
ment shall be inflicted at any Court
Martial, which shall extend to Life
or Limb.*

It was Resolved in the Negative.

Dissentient,

I. **B**Ecause the Exercise of Martial Law
in time of Peace, with such Power,
as is given by this Bill to inflict Punishments
extending to Life and Limb, was not in
the first Year of this Reign, nor hath in
any

any former Reign been allowed within this Kingdom, by Consent of Parliament; but hath, upon any Attempts made to introduce such a Power, been oppos'd and condemn'd by Parliament, as repugnant to *Magna Charta*, and inconsistent with the fundamental Rights and Liberties of a free People.

II. Because, after the Peace of *Ryswick* and that of *Utrecht*, in the several Reigns of King *William* and Queen *Anne* of Glorious and Ever Blessed Memories, no such Power was given to any Court Martial; yet it is well known, that the Forces then continued on Foot were kept in exact Discipline and Order.

III. Because it is not ascertain'd, either by this Bill, or by any other known Law or Rule, what Words or Facts amount to Mutiny or Desertion, or to an Exciting, Causing, or Joining in Mutiny; and consequently the Judges of a Court Martial have it in their Power, to declare what Words or Facts they think fit to be Mutiny or Desertion, and to take away the Life of any Officer or Soldier by such an Arbitrary Decision.

IV. Because, should Death be thought the proper Punishment in time of Peace for Mutiny or Desertion, or even for the least Disobedience to any lawful Command; yet, as we conceive, the Nature

of such Offences ought first to have been ascertained by this Bill; and the said Offences being declared Capital, the Tryal thereof ought to have been left to the ordinary Course of Law; in Consequence whereof the Officers and Soldiers would, upon such Tryals, have been entitled to all those valuable Privileges, which are the Birth-right of every *Briton*. Nor doth it appear to us, That any Inconvenience could thereby have arisen to the Publick in time of Peace; at least, not any such as can justify our Depriving the Soldiery of those Legal Rights, which belong to the meanest of their Fellow-Subjects, and even to the vilest of Malefactors.

Then a Motion being made, and the Question being put, That it be an Instruction to the said Committee of the whole House, That they do make an effectual Provision to secure the Obedience both of the Officers and Soldiers, to be continued by this Bill, to the Civil Magistrate according to Law.

It was Resolved in the Negative.

Dissentient'

I. Because no Provision whatsoever is made by this Bill for Securing the Obedience of the Military to the Civil Power,
on

on which the Preservation of our Constitution depends.

II. Because we conceive, that a great Number of armed Men governed by Martial Law, as they have it in their Power, so are naturally inclined not only to disobey, but to insult the Authority of the Civil Magistrate; and we are confirmed in this Opinion, as well by the Experience of what hath happened here at Home, as by the Histories of all Ages and Nations; from which it appears, that wherever an effectual Provision hath not been made to secure the Obedience of the Soldiers to the Laws of their Country, the Military hath constantly subverted and swallowed up the Civil Power.

<i>Devonshire,</i>	<i>Harcourt,</i>	<i>Bute,</i>
<i>W. Ebor'</i>	<i>Willoughby Br.</i>	<i>P. Hereford'</i>
<i>Buckingham,</i>	<i>Townshend,</i>	<i>Berkeley, Str.</i>
<i>Anglesey,</i>	<i>Boyle,</i>	<i>Northampton,</i>
<i>Jo. Winton'</i>	<i>Bristol,</i>	<i>Islay,</i>
<i>North and Grey,</i>	<i>Carlton,</i>	<i>Weston,</i>
<i>Scarsdale,</i>	<i>Foley,</i>	<i>Mansel,</i>
<i>Strafford,</i>	<i>Tedcaster,</i>	<i>Fr. Roffen'</i>
<i>Poulet,</i>	<i>Gower,</i>	<i>Oxford,</i>
<i>Guilford,</i>	<i>Rutland,</i>	<i>Fr. Cestrien'</i>
<i>Delorain,</i>	<i>Montjoy,</i>	<i>Geo. Bristol'</i>
<i>Abingdon,</i>	<i>Bathurst,</i>	<i>Compton,</i>
<i>Dartmouth,</i>	<i>Lumley,</i>	<i>Masham,</i>
<i>Belhaven,</i>	<i>Trevar,</i>	<i>Greenwich.</i>
<i>Jo. London'</i>	<i>Bingley,</i>	



Die Lunæ, 24^o February, 1717.

The Question being put, Whether this Bill shall pass?

It was Resolved in the Affirmative.

Dissentient'

I. **B**Ecause the Number of Sixteen Thousand Three Hundred Forty Seven Men is declar'd necessary by this Bill, but it is not therein declar'd, nor are we able, any Way, to satisfy Ourselves, from whence that Necessity should arise : The Kingdom being now (God be prais'd) in full Peace, without any just Apprehension, either of Insurrections at Home, or Invasions from Abroad.

II. Because so numerous a Force is near double to what hath ever been allow'd within this Kingdom, by Authority of Parliament in Times of publick Tranquillity; and being, as we conceive, no Ways necessary to support, may (we fear) endanger our Constitution; which hath never yet been entirely subverted, but by a Standing Army.

III. Be-

III. Because the Charge of keeping up so great a Force, ought not unnecessarily to be laid on the Nation, already overburthen'd with heavy Debts ; and this Charge we conceive to be still more unnecessarily increas'd by the great Number of Officers, now kept on the Establishment, in Time of Peace ; a Number far greater (in Proportion to that of the Soldiery commanded by them) than hath ever yet been thought requisite in times of actual War.

IV. Because such a Number of Soldiers, dispers'd in Quarters throughout the Kingdom, may occasion great Hardships, and become very grievous to the People, and thereby cause, or increase, their Disaffection, and will probably ruin many of his Majesty's good Subjects, on whom they shall be quartered, and who have been already, by that Means, greatly impoverish'd.

V. Because such a Standing Force, dangerous in it self to a Free People in Time of Peace, is, in our Opinion, render'd yet more dangerous by their being made subject to Martial Law ; a Law unknown to our Constitution, destructive of our Liberties, not endur'd by our Ancestors, and never mention'd in any of our Statutes, but in order to condemn it.

VI. Be-

VI. Because the Officers and Soldiers themselves, thus subjected to Martial Law, are thereby, upon their Tryals, divested of all those Rights and Privileges, which render the People of this Realm the Envy of other Nations, and become liable to such Hardships and Punishments, as the Lenity and Mercy of our known Laws utterly disallow; and we cannot but think those Persons best prepar'd, and most easily tempted, to strip others of their Rights, who have already lost their own.

VII. Because a much larger Jurisdiction is given to Courts-Martial by this Bill, than to us seems necessary for maintaining Discipline in the Army; such Jurisdiction extending not only to Mutiny, Desertion, Breach of Duty, and Disobedience to military Commands, but also to all Immoralities, and every Instance of Misbehaviour, which may be committed by any Officer, or Soldier towards any of his Fellow-Subjects: By which Means, the Law of the Land, in Cases proper to be judg'd by that alone, may, by the summary Methods of Proceedings in Courts-Martial, be obstructed, or superseded, and many grievous Offences may remain unpunish'd.

VIII. Because the Officers constituting a Court-Martial do at once supply the Place of Judges and Jurymen, and ought therefore, as we conceive, to be sworn upon their
their

their Trying any Offence whatsoever; and yet it is provided by this Bill, that such Officers shall be sworn upon their Trying such Offences only, as are punishable by Death; which Provision we apprehend to be defective, and unwarranted by any Precedent: There being no Instance, within our Knowledge, wherein the Judges of any Court, having Cognizance of Capital and Lesser Crimes, are under the Obligation of an Oath, in respect of the one, and not of the other.

IX. Because the Articles of War, thought necessary to secure the Discipline of the Army in Cases unprovided for by this Bill, ought, in our Opinion, to have been inserted therein, in like Manner as the Articles and Orders for Regulating and Governing the Navy were Enacted in the Thirteenth Year of King *Charles* the Second; to the End that due Consideration might have been had by Parliament, of the Duty enjoyn'd by each Article to the Soldiers, and of the Measure of their Punishment. Whereas the Sanction of Parliament is now given by this Bill to what they have had no Opportunity to consider.

X. Because the Clause in the Bill, enabling his Majesty to establish Articles of War, and erect Courts Martial, with Power to try and determine any Offences,
to


to be specify'd in such Articles, and to inflict Punishments for the same, within this Kingdom, in time of Peace, doth, as we conceive, in all those Instances, vest a sole Legislative Power in the Crown; which Power, how safely soever it may be lodg'd with his present Majesty, and how tenderly soever it may be exercis'd by him, may yet prove of dangerous Consequence, should it be drawn into Precedent in future Reigns.

XI. Because the Clause in the Bill alledg'd to be made, for enabling honest Creditors to recover their just Debts from Soldiers, seems to us, rather to give a Protection to the Soldiers, than any real Advantage to his Creditor, or other Person, having just Cause of Action against him. It protects the Person of a Soldier from Executions, as well as Mesne Process, for any Debt under Ten Pounds; and it protects the Estate and Effects, as well as the Person, of every Soldier, from all other Suits, but for Debt, where the Cause of Action doth not amount to the like Sum. And in other Cases, where the Cause of Action exceeds that value, Plaintiffs are in many Instances put under such unreasonable Difficulties, as we conceive, before they can be allow'd even to commence their Suit, that their bare Compliance therewith may become more grievous

vous to them, than the Loss of their Debt, or a quiet Submission to the Wrong sustained. By which Means, his Majesty's good Subjects may be highly injur'd in their Properties, and insulted in their Persons, by the Soldiery, and yet be deprived of the legal Remedies appointed for the Redress of such Grievances.

<i>W. Ebor'</i>	<i>Boyle,</i>	<i>Mansel,</i>
<i>Northampton,</i>	<i>Tedcaster,</i>	<i>Dartmouth,</i>
<i>Strafford,</i>	<i>Bute,</i>	<i>Batburst,</i>
<i>Scarsdale,</i>	<i>Guilford,</i>	<i>P. Hereford'</i>
<i>Fr. Cestriens'</i>	<i>Litchfield,</i>	<i>Fr. Roffen'</i>
<i>Bristol,</i>	<i>Harcourt,</i>	<i>Weston,</i>
<i>Gowver,</i>	<i>North and</i>	<i>Trevor,</i>
<i>Greenwich,</i>	<i>Grey,</i>	<i>Oxford,</i>
<i>Compton,</i>	<i>Foley,</i>	<i>Abingdon.</i>
<i>Poulet,</i>	<i>Ilay,</i>	

THE



THE
 Lord LANSDOWN'S
 SPEECH

Against the OCCASIONAL CONFORMITY Bill,
December the 19th 1718.



HAVING never trespassed on your Patience before, I may hope for the readier Excuse, if I trouble you for once, and I give you my Word, that no Indulgence shall encourage me to make a Custom of it.

My Lords,

I always understood that the Toleration was meant as an Ease to tender Consciences, and not an Indulgence to hardened ones. The Act to prevent Occasional Conformity corrects only a particular Crime of particular Men ; it concerns no other Set of *Dissenters*, but those Followers of *Judas* who came to the *Lord's Supper* to sell and betray him ; this Crime, however palliated or defended, even by some Reverend Fathers of the Church, is
 no

no less than making the God of Truth as it were in Person subservient to Acts of Hypocrisy ; no less than sacrificing the Mystical Body and Blood of our Saviour to worldly and sinister Purposes. An Impiety of the highest Nature, which in Justice calls for Correction, and in Charity for Prevention.

The bare receiving the Holy Eucharist could never be intended simply as a Qualification for an Office, but as an open Declaration, and indubitable Proof of being a sincere Member of the Church. Whoever presumes to receive it with any other View profanes it, and may be said to seek his Preferment in this World, by eating and drinking to his own Damnation in the next.

It is very surprizing to hear the Merit of *Dissenters* so highly extolled and magnified within these Walls ; for who is he amongst us, that cannot tell of some Ancestor either Sequester'd or Murther'd by them. It is notoriously known, that they brought the Royal Martyr to the Block ; but to extenuate that Guilt in favour of the *Presbyterians*, it seems to be insinuated by a very learned Lord, that they perform'd good Offices at last, and were Instruments in the Restoration. What Offices, what Instruments, upon what Terms did they resort to the King ? Upon no better

better than their Brethren the *Scots* had invited him before, to have an insignificant Tool of a King, a Cypher of a King, to walk in their Leading-strings. To restore themselves, not him to Dominion, was their only Aim, they groaned under the Oppression of other Sectaries, after having been themselves the greatest Oppressors of Mankind; nor had they any other Means of arriving at Deliverance (or Revenge rather) but by recovering Royal Power under a nominal King. This General *Monk* well knew, who was privy to their Intrigues, and hence arose all the Difficulties that incumbered him in the prosecution of his own Scheme: He was under a Necessity of making use of their Discontent, and could neither intirely trust or throw them off: But that the Monarchy was restored free and independent, the Church re-established pure and undefiled, was owing to his Virtue and good Conduct; no Thanks to the *Presbyterians*.

Nor was K. *Charles* scarce warm in his Throne, before they broke out into a new Rebellion, and continued incessant Disturbers of his whole Reign, sometimes with sham Plots, and sometimes with real ones.

It was likewise observed by the same learned Lord, that they were hardly used, Fined, Banished, and Imprisoned. Be it so, but 'twas not upon a Religious Account; they

they might be punished for breach of the Law, disturbing the publick Peace, for illegal Meetings and Assemblies, and other State Crimes; but what was there more in that than the present Case of the *Non-jurors*?

The Clemency of that Reign, even to *Dissenters*, has been sufficiently vindicated by a noble Earl, who was call'd up (by some Reflections which fell from a reverend Prelate) to give an Account of the intended Comprehension. The Church opened her Arms, the Clergy and Prelates, the King condescended to invite them with all the Temptations of Indulgence and Christian Charity; but what was the Return? Nothing but a morose haughty Deportment, severe Contradictions or sullen Evasions; they scorned to enter our Churches as Brethren and Fellow-Christians, but as Conquerors and Plunderers; they have no Grace but what is founded in Dominion. Their Behaviour in the subsequent Reign of K. *J.* is fresh in every one's Memory; that unhappy Prince was undone by giving Attention to their Addresses, and depending upon their Promises.

But 'tis said they have been not only quiet since, but have appear'd zealous for the present Establishment, and no wonder; for who but themselves or their Favour-

ers, have been thought worthy to be countenanced.

A noble Lord inquiring into the Reason of the present universal Discontent (for such I find it is agreed to be on all Hands) has been pleased to impute it to Mis-conduct in the Administration; a little unluckily, I confess, since it was answer'd, That at the Time when that Discontent most flamed, his Lordship himself was at the Head of the Administration.

Another noble Lord very deservedly in a high Station, charg'd it upon Fate, the Malignity of the Stars, a certain unaccountable Disposition in the Heavens, for which there is no apparent Reason nor Remedy.

But the Reason is plain, flagrant and notorious; the early Impatience and Presumption of *Dissenters*, their insolent and undissembled Expectations, their open Insults of the Clergy, their fixing Bills on our Churches with this scandalous Inscription, *A House to be Lett*: Their publick Vindication of the Murder of *K. Charles*; their vile Reflections on the Memory of *Queen Anne*, for ever dear to the People of *England*; besides many other indecent arrogant Provocations (too many to enumerate) was too much to bear, so that the Violences that ensued let the Aggressors answer for: But then their acting all
this

this not only with Impunity, but with a Reward out of the publick Treasure, was more than a sufficient Ground for Jealousie.

A noble Duke seems with some *Warmth* to have taken Offence, that the *Roman Catholicks* and *Dissenters* have been mentioned in the Debate upon the same Level, whereas their Religion is High Treason. But I never yet understood that their Religion was High Treason; indeed I have heard that it might be High Treason to make Converts to it; and by the same Reason the Reformed Religion may be High Treason in Popish Countries. But if we may compare them with the *Dissenters*, upon a Foot of Merit with respect to the Government, the *Catholicks*, as far as has been yet made to appear, have infinitely the Advantage. To whom do we our *Magna Charta*? To our ancient Barons unreform'd; and were there not as many Struggles for Liberty before the Reformation as since?

To whom do we owe the Revolution but to Catholick Powers? Even the Pope himself United to encourage and support the Prince of *Orange* in his Undertaking.

To whom do we owe our present Security in the *Protestant* Establishment, but to the most Potent, the most Arbitrary, the most Famous for Persecution of all

the Popish Powers, the most inveterate and implacable Enemies of the *Protestant* Perswasion, *France*, *Savoy*, and the *Emperour*? And have not the Ministers, one after another, assur'd us, that these mortal Enemies to our Souls in another World, are our only Guarantees for our Salvation in this?

Our *Protestant* Brethren, the *States*, were neither consulted nor intrusted, but seem to have been left like Slaves to follow the Dictates of *Great Britain* and *France*, and to accede implicitly at their Peril; they have however thought fit hitherto to continue *Dissenters*, tho' perhaps they may in time occasionally Conform, as Circumstances may happen to press. But 'till then, our only trusty Allies are our good Catholick Friends.

If any Man can say as much for the *Dissenters*, let him speak; the reverend Prelates who have exerted in this Debate, having been prepar'd to fulminate against the Test, without being admitted into the Secret of withdrawing the Question, have unfortunately imploy'd their Quivers in the Air.

* *One indeed there is*, who must not be forgot, who wandering beyond the rest in a long Historical Collection from Pamphlets

* Dr, G——n, Bishop of Lin——n.

and


and Libels, has let himself loose against the Sacred Memory of the *Royal Martyr*; he has accused him, if not of all *Popery*, of half *Popery*, very near *Popery*, almost all *Popery*; why would he not speak out? For what means this School Distinction, betwixt almost all a *Papist*, and quite. Hard Fate of the best of Men and of Kings!

He who renounc'd the Purple to preserve the Lawn, who dyed for the Church, and who is commemorated as a Martyr for the Church, is yet expos'd within an Age after his Descent from the Scaffold to the Grave, to be murthered over again in Fame, even in the supreme Court of Judicature, by a Successor in that venerable Order, that very Episcopacy, for which he Sacrificed his Liberty, his Life, his Crown!

The execrable Wretch who sever'd his Head from his Body, perform'd the inhuman Office in a Mask; but this holy Executioner, who cuts what the Axe could not hurt, what the Regicides could not take from him, his good Name, has not been ashamed to attempt it bare-fac'd. It grieves me, that this Animadversion shou'd fall to my Lot, to the Lot of any private Lord: I was in hopes a General Indignation would have warm'd this noble Assembly, to have made it their own Act to re-

prehend such irreverend Slanders, as would have much better become a Descendant from *Bradshaw*, than a Successor of *Laud*; but I ask Pardon, this unlucky Reflection may have transported me too far. In a Word, that I may not appear prejudiced to Merit in any Man, I will conclude, with this Motion, that a List be laid before us of such *Dissenters* by Name, as have in any Kind merited from the Publick, and I will most readily come into any Measures that may distinguish them and their particular Service.

God forbid but that they should have all their Deserts.



A

S P E E C H

Made in the

House of C O M M O N S,

A P R I L the 24th 1716;

Against the B I L L for the R E P E A L of the

T R I E N N I A L A C T,

And for enlarging the Time of Continuance of
P A R L I A M E N T S.

By *Archib. Hutcheson*, Esq.

Mr. S P E A K E R,



Cannot content my self in the great Question now before you to deliver my Opinion barely by Voting in it; for I think it of that Importance to the Nation, to deserve and need the most thorough Examination. I heartily wish it

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might

might have had a much longer Time of Consideration, than I perceive Gentlemen are dispos'd to give it ; but since we are enter'd on the Debate of it, I shall endeavour to express my Thoughts about it with great Plainness and Freedom.

My present Opinion, Sir, according to the best Judgment I am able to form, is, That if we should give our Consent to the passing of the Bill before us into a Law, we should be guilty of a most notorious *Breach* of the *Trust* reposed in us, by those who sent us hither, and shou'd make a very dangerous Step towards the *Undermining* of that Constitution, which our Ancestors have been so careful to preserve, and thought no Expence, either of Blood or Treasure, too much for that purpose, and under which we do *yet* enjoy those Privileges and Advantages, which no other Nation in the World can at this Day boast of.

This is the Light in which the Bill yet appears to me ; and therefore, if I did believe what some Gentlemen do, That it would be conducive to several Good Ends, yet that would not be sufficient to gain my Consent thereto ; for I cannot think those Ends, however desirable, equivalent to such a Price, as that of giving up, or even of making a dangerous Advance towards the giving up, entirely, the B R I T

TISH CONSTITUTION. Much less wou'd I give my Consent to such a Law, when I am of Opinion, That it wou'd be so far from contributing to the Ends pretended to be aimed at thereby, that it would have the direct contrary Effect: And if we are not *to do Evil that Good may come of it*, surely we must not *do Evil*, only to bring *Mischief* upon ourselves.

These are my Reasons against the Bill, That our Consent to it wou'd be a Breach of Trust, and a dangerous Breach upon our Constitution; and that, if it were not liable to this Objection, That yet it wou'd serve to purposes directly contrary to those pretended to be aim'd at, by Gentlemen who are for the Bill; I shall endeavour to explain my self in these Points.

Give me Leave therefore to mention, what appears to me to have been the *ancient* Constitution of Parliament, and also how the same has been, and stands chang'd at this time, with relation to the Matter which is now the Subject of our Debate. I believe it will, nay, it must be agreed, That before the Reign of *Henry VIII.* there was no single Instance of a *Prorogation* of Parliament: That Parliaments had only one Sessions, and those generally, very short ones, none of which ever lasted a Year: That to prevent the Mischief of long Intervals of Parliament, It
was

was Enacted in the Fourth Year of *Edward III.* That *Parliaments should be holden annually*, and this was confirmed by subsequent Acts of Parliament: And therefore I may venture to affirm, That by the Ancient Constitution, Parliaments were to be holden frequently; and to be of the Continuance only of one Sessions, and that there was no Right or Power in the Crown to Prorogue the same: I say, this I can affirm on the same Foundation, and with as strong Reason, as I can affirm, That the Eldest Son, after the Death of his Father, shall inherit, as Heir at Law, the Lands in Fee-simple; or that the Youngest Son shall inherit, where the Custom of *Borough-English* prevails; or that all the Sons shall equally inherit the Lands of *Gavel-kind*; or, indeed, as I can affirm of any part of the Common-Law, or the particular Usages of the Kingdom; for these are Supported only by constant Practice, and Prescription immemorial; and they neither need, nor can have a stronger Support than this; for surely, of all Laws, those most be allowed to carry with them the strongest Evidence of Justice, which have been always submitted to, without any Change or Alteration.

The Application is obvious to the Point in Debate, I mean, as far as the Reign
of

of *Henry* the Eighth : And if at that Time this was the Constitution of Parliament, it will not be easie to shew how the same has been since Legally chang'd ; but I shall speak to this more fully, after I have answer'd an Objection which has been made. It has been said, " That 'tis no Proof that " the Crown had no Power to Prorogue " Parliaments, and to continue the same " Parliament for several Sessions, altho' " there were no Instances thereof, until the " Reign of *Hen.* the Eighth". If this Objection have any Weight, it will equally hold against any other part of the Common Law, which had hitherto remained uncontested : For may not the Younger Sons, in this way of Reasoning, say, 'That altho' there be no Instance, that any of them have hitherto claimed to inherit, equally with the Eldest, the Lands in Fee-simple, that yet this is no Proof against their Right of making such a Claim, and having it determin'd for them. And if such a Case shou'd be brought into *Westminster-Hall*, it is evident, that there is no Act of Parliament which settles the Point, nor any preceding Resolution, because the Matter was never in question before ; and yet surely no Gentleman will affirm, that the Judges would be at Liberty to determine this a new Case, whatever Equity they might conceive in the Pretensions of the

the Younger Sons, but wou'd be strictly ty'd to adjudge according to the constant and uninterrupted Usage. And had the Lords and Commons, when the first Attempt of Proroguing was made upon them, insisted, That the Crown had no such Power, and the Opinion of the Judges had been required therein, it was impossible that they could have determined otherwise, than according to the constant Usage, or that they would have adjudged such an Original Power in the Crown, which had never been exerted from the earliest Mention which our Records, or History, make of Parliaments, to that very Day ; or that they could have conceiv'd it possible, that the Crown could have had such a Power, and yet never have asserted it in one single Instance, in the Course of so many Hundred Years.

If the Facts I have mention'd are, as they appear to me to be, undeniably true, the Inference I thence make, is next to a Demonstration : and I may venture to add, That there is no part of our Laws built on a more solid Foundation, and supported with stronger Reasons : Reasons, which must eternally have the greatest Weight, and make the deepest Impression, on the Minds of a People, who have any *Sense of Liberty* ; and, Thanks be to God ! we are yet a *Free Nation*. For without
the

the Frequency of Parliaments, the Opportunity of Redressing those Grievances, which more or less have happened in all Reigns, from the Influence and *Administration* of *Evil Counsellors*, and *Wicked Ministers*, who will always prefer their own private Interests and sinister Views, to the Honour of their Prince, and Welfare of their Country : And it is to the Dread which such *impious Monsters* have always had, I hope will ever have, of the *just Vengeance of a Parliament*, that we hitherto owe the Preservation of our Liberties ; for, had the Times of being called to an Account in Parliament been at any considerable Distance, the *Attempts* of *bold and daring Men* would have had no Curb ; and indeed 'tis but one Step more, and that not difficult, from a *LONG*, to the entire *Disuse* of Parliaments, and resolving the Government into an absolute Monarchy ; but I will urge this Point no farther, because I believe 'twill be generally allowed ; and that, whatever might be the private Opinion of any particular Person, no *Briton* will be yet so hardy as to declare himself against the *Necessity* of *frequent Parliaments*.

I wish Gentlemen would as generally concur, that the other Part which I have mentioned, and I think have made appear, to have been our Antient Constitution,
were

were as absolutely necessary to the Preservation of our Liberties, I mean Parliaments of one Sessions, not only *frequent*, but *frequent* NEW PARLIAMENTS. The Thing indeed appears very evident to me ; so Evident, that in my poor Opinion, our Liberties would not be more, nay not so precarious under an absolute Monarchy, as with a House of Commons who had Right to sit either for many Years together, or without any Limitation of Time. For 'tis certain, that a Prince, who had stood only on the Bottom of his own absolute Authority, assisted with a few Ministers and some Troops, would still think himself pretty much upon his good Behaviour towards the united Body of his People ; and would (probably) be cautious of exerting his Power in such a manner, as to give a just Provocation to a general Revolt, and setting up another in his stead ; but a *Prince*, with a *Parliament at his Devotion*, would be infinitely more *terrible*, and with much greater Security, might give a Loose to every Extravagancy of Power ; for when the Representatives of the People, who are chosen by them to be the *Guardians* of their *Liberties*, can be prevailed on, for *little Advantages* to themselves, to *betray* their Trust, and come into all the Measures of a *designing Ministry*, 'tis then, indeed, that the Liberties

erties of a People are in the most imminent Danger; and surely, there is great Reason to apprehend, that a House of Commons might soon become very obsequious to a Ministry, if they were to sit for a long Period, or without Limitation, and that there were no near Day in view, of a new Election, when the *Conduct* of *Gentlemen in this Place* would be inquired into in their respective Countries.

I believe it will not be denied, That 'tis very possible for a Ministry, by *Pensions* and *Employments* to some, and by the Expectations rais'd in others, and by the *Corruption* of *Electors*, and returning Officers, to obtain a very great Majority, entirely and blindly at their Devotion, even at the very first Meeting of a Parliament, and that by a *Committee* of *Elections* and other proper Helps, their Party may daily encrease; and that such a Parliament may be so far from protecting the Liberties of their Country, or from being a Terror to evil Ministers, as to become themselves the Tools of Oppression in the Hand of such a Ministry, and by their Authority, to consecrate the worst of Actions; to declare every honest Patriot, who has the Courage to attempt to stem the Tide of Wickedness, and to stand up for the Liberties of his Country, to be its greatest Enemy; and those who are ready to give it

it up, to be the only true Friends of our Constitution; and if this shou'd ever happen to be our Case, I beg Gentlemen to consider, *whether a greater Curse could fall on any People, than to have such a Parliament as THIS entail'd upon them.*

I remember very well, what an Outcry was raised against the last Parliament, on a Suspicion only, that a Repeal of the *Triennial Act* was intended, and the Arguments against it without Doors, were then the very same with those which are now urg'd against it within: What an Inconsistency must it then appear, to see those very Gentlemen, who were then the most zealous Opposers of such an Attempt, become now the most *violent Advocates* for it? And will it not also, in some measure, affect their Integrity, publickly to own, that the Arguments they pretended to be then influenced by, had not the least Weight with them; and that the Thing in it self was very desirable, when there should be a good Ministry and Parliament in Being, and pernicious only in the then Situation of Affairs? It was not certainly from this Consideration, that the late Ministry and Parliaments were diverted from the Attempt; They, doubtless, had a very good Opinion of themselves, and were confirmed therein by the *Voice* of a great *Majority* of the *People*; and which, by a most

most strange and unaccountable Witchcraft; still continues in their Favour, if I may depend upon what several who have argued for the Bill seem to have agreed to.

I must beg, Gentlemen, to consider, that the Mischief I have mentioned, will be no ways prevented by the present Posture of our Affairs; for tho' we may have now a good Ministry and Parliament, their Continuance, notwithstanding the intended Law, will still depend on the Pleasure of the Prince; for, I do not perceive that any Gentleman will move for a Clause to continue the Ministry for Life; or that the Parliament shall not be dissolved without their own Consents; and if, by ill Advice to his Majesty, a Change should happen, may it not so fall out, that a long Continuance of a new Ministry and Parliament, may be of infinite Prejudice to the Nation? Surely, therefore, it will be Wisdom, in the making of this, or any other Law, not to consider some little present Conveniency, but the general and obvious Tendency of the same. I therefore think that I am yet warranted to say, and shall say it, 'till I am convinced that I have mistaken the Matter, That *frequent new Parliaments* was the *Ancient Constitution*; That until the Reign of *Henry the Eighth*, there was no stronger Evidence for any Part of the

Common Law, than there was for this Part of our Constitution, and that the same was built, and stands upon as solid a Foundation, as any Law ever did, or can do, being absolutely necessary and *essential to the Liberties of a Free People.*

It is true, *Henry* the Eighth, in the 21st Year of his Reign, prorogued the Parliament, which was the first Instance of this kind, and succeeding Princes have, more or less, continued the same Practice; but I can no wise agree to what some Gentlemen would thence infer, That the CROWN HAD ALWAYS A RIGHT TO DO SO; for I think I have made the contrary very evidently appear; and that until the 21st Year of *Henry* the Eighth, no part of our Common Law was better establish'd than this Ancient *English* Constitution of frequent new Parliaments. But it is remarkable, that this having been the first Instance of a Prorogation, it was thought convenient to strengthen the further Continuance of that Parliament by Adjournment also. If the Crown, before the Time I have mentioned, had not the Power of continuing the same Parliament by Prorogations; it will not be easy to shew, how they have come legally by it since: Sure I am, that there is no Act of Parliament which vests any such Power in the Crown, and Prescription immemorial is
not

not so much as pretended to. The short of the Matter seems to me then, no more than this; A very Arbitrary Prince, the better to serve the Ends he had then in View, boldly invades the Liberties of his People, and usurps a new Prerogative, unheard of before: That Parliament tamely submits thereto, either out of Fear, or for baser Reasons; perhaps, they were pleased with a longer Continuance, and the agreeable Prospect of sharing in the Advantages of Laws, which they were afterwards to make, I mean, the Dissolution of Abbeys; and altho' thereby the Foundation of our happy Reformation was laid, yet that is entirely owing to another Cause, and in no wise to the pious Intentions, either of that Prince, or of that Parliament. This new Prerogative was at first used with much Caution, and thereby the fatal Tendency thereof was not so soon discovered; and when the Possession of this Power became strengthened in the Crown by a Continuance of Time, and the Acquiescence of the Nation, it was much more difficult to get rid of the Innovation, than it was at first to have prevented the same; and it has been, I presume thought more prudent, to continue our Acquiescence, whilst the Inconveniences were in any Measure supportable, rather than to endeavour to retrieve

this most valuable Part of our 'Ancient Constitution by Force of Arms; altho' this Remedy hath been resorted to frequently, and on much slihter Occasions in my Opinion.

But I cannot see, that from a Power so assum'd, and so continued, it will follow, either that the Ancient Constitution was so, or that it ought to be so at this Day; and I must say, that whatever Arguments can be brought to support that Doctrine, will equally justify the Exercise of any other Part of Arbitrary Power; for upon the starting up of any new Prerogative, 'tis but saying, That the Crown had always a Right to it, altho' it was never claimed or exercised before; and there may be *Parliaments complaisant* enough to acquiesce therein, which perhaps might be ashamed, by a new express Law, barefac'd and unmask'd, to give up the Liberties of their Country; and I do not see, but that this would be as good a Commencement for any new Prerogative, as the Power of proroguing at first had. Let Gentlemen consider, what the Ancient Laws of *England* were, in the Matter of Imprisonments, and what the Practice was for some time before the Act of *Habeas Corpus*. I hope there is no *Briton*, so abandoned to the Notions of Slavery, as to affirm, that it ever was by the Laws of
of

of *England*, in the Power of the Prince to imprison any of his Subjects during his Will and Pleasure, and without any Reasons assigned: They were to be imprisoned only; when legally charg'd with Crimes, and were to be either try'd for the same, or releas'd from their Imprisonment, in a reasonable time; and as to this, the Act of *Habeas Corpus* was not introductive of a new Law, but declarative only of the Old. This is so essential to the Being of a free People, that it must be agreed, that our Law was always thus; I am sure, without it, our Condition would differ little from the Slavery of *Turkey*; for the *Bow-string* itself, a speedy Death, is *Mercy*, when compar'd to a *lingering Confinement*. And yet 'tis certain, that before the Act of *Habeas Corpus*, the good Subjects of *England* were sometimes thus Arbitrarily and Illegally imprisoned, to gratify the Avarice, Ambition, Malice, or Revenge of *evil Counsellors* and *wicked Ministers*; and the Advocates for *Prerogative* did as strenuously insist on the Legality of this Power, as they did on any other, which was claim'd by the Crown. I cannot indeed tell how long this Power of Arbitrary imprisoning had been exercis'd, but I'm apt to believe it may vye for Antiquity, with the Power of *Proroguing Parliaments*.

I must also put Gentlemen in mind of the *Prerogatives* claim'd and exercis'd by King *James* the Second, to dispense with the Laws, to command our Bishops and Clergy to read in their Churches his illegal Proclamations, and to suspend and imprison them for disobeying, with many others of the like kind, which are recited in the Claim of Rights; and 'tis certain, that had we not been rescued by the Revolution, all these, and many more, had been good Prerogatives at this Day, and might have been all of them supported with as good Arguments, as any can be used for the Power of *Proroguing* in the Reign of *Henry* the Eighth; and some of them with as good, nay, with the very same Arguments as are used for the Legality of the Power at this very Time. I hope therefore we shall be very cautious of admitting such Arguments, as tend naturally to support all Extravagancies of Power whatsoever, and to let in upon us an Inundation of Oppressions.

In the late Reigns, and in particular by the long Pensionary Parliament, in the Reign of *Charles* the Second, the Nation became very sensible of the mischievous Consequences, which had already happened, and the more fatal which might still result from the dangerous Breach
which

which had been made in our ancient Constitution: It was now evident to the meanest Capacity, That a Designing Prince, who, with the Assistance of a Wicked Ministry, should be able, after several Tryals, at last to procure a Parliament to his purpose, wou'd have the Liberties of his People entirely in his Power, and might govern them at Pleasure; from which State of Slavery it was as evident, that nothing less than a Revolution cou'd rescue them; and if they fail'd in that Experiment, that then their Chains wou'd be rivetted for ever. Under this melancholly Prospect of Affairs the Nation groan'd, and Complaints were heard in every Corner of our Streets; and even the *very Pensioners* in that Parliament were not arrived to such a pitch of Impiety, as to take pleasure in the *Drudgery* they had engag'd in, but acted with Reluctancy and Remorse, and as we have been very lately told in this Place, betrayed the Cause they had so wickedly espous'd, and frequently gave notice to the Friends of *England*, of the Attempts which were to be made on the Liberties of their Country. This *Pensionary Parliament* was at last Dissolv'd, but on what Views, and by what Advice, I will not pretend to say. Certain it is, that that Prince never had it afterwards in his Power, in a

Parliamentary way, to destroy the Liberties of the People. The *Resumption* of *Charters* was then put in practice, with many other Expedients, towards the Establishment of an Absolute Monarchy, which had been long in view : But by the Death of that Prince, and the unskilful Conduct of his next Successor, an End was put to those Designs for that time, the People having unanimously applied the only Remedy in such Cases, and this brought about the late happy Revolution.

I have been often surprized, when I reflected how wanting we were to ourselves, upon that Turn, in not retrieving and securing for ever, by the Claim of Rights, our Ancient Constitution of frequent New Parliaments, which, in my poor Opinion, was much more valuable than all that we claim'd besides ; but we obtain'd this in Part, by the Act pass'd in the sixth Year of the Reign of King *William*, and which the Bill before us is intended to repeal ; for by that Act, we are to have *new Parliaments*, at least once in *three Years* ; and even this is such a Security to the *British Liberties*, that all the Objections against *Triennial Elections* are but very Trifles, when compar'd with that : Therefore I am not a little surpriz'd, when I hear Gentlemen say, That the *Triennial Act* is a new Constitution, and
that

that the Repeal intended thereof, will be but restoring the King in Part to his *Prerogative*, and setting the Constitution a little nearer to what it anciently was; surely, there is nothing further from the Truth of the Fact : The Ancient Constitution was at least, *Annual new Parliaments*, and this was broke in upon, and that Breach afterwards continued in the Manner which I have already set forth ; and by this Act, we have no new Privilege granted, but only restor'd, in part, to those which we always had a Right to. But were it in reality a new Grant, shall we give it up, to enlarge only the Prerogatives of the Crown ? May we not, in the same way of Reasoning, give up the *Habeas Corpus* Act, and all the other Privileges and Immunities, which have been obtain'd to the People from the Crown, from the Date of *Magna Charta*, to this very Day ? This surely has not been the good Old way of Reasoning in this Place, and I presume, it will meet with due Discouragement at this Time. I hope we shall, on this, and all other Occasions, acquit our selves like *Britons*, and not give up, in *Complaisance* to any *Ministry*, the Smallest, much less, the Greatest and most Valuable Privilege of those we represent ; and that we shall have the utmost Caution in making any
Step,

Step, that may have the least Tendency towards that Slavery, from which, at the Risque of a Revolution, and an immense Expence of Blood and Treasure, we have so lately rescued our selves. I hope yet to live to see the Day, when our present Gracious Sovereign King *George* the First, will have the Glory to compleat the entire Restoring of our Ancient Constitution, to which his Predecessor King *William* the Third hath made such a considerable Advance; and that instead of *Triennial*, we shall have *Annual new Parliaments*. Then indeed the *British* Liberties will be founded on a Rock, which the Machinations of the worst Ministers will never be able to prevail against; and the Crown will be frequently and faithfully informed of the Sentiments of the People, and be thereby enabled to preserve with them that Confidence, and good Correspondence, so absolutely necessary for the Happiness of both. To this I may add, that the Inconveniences, from *Triennial* Elections, will thereby be much more effectually redress'd and cur'd, than ever they will be, by passing the Bill before us, into a Law. Upon the whole therefore, I shall take leave to affirm, that we have at present an indisputable Right to *Triennial new Par-*

Parliaments, and a very just Claim, (for I know of no Law that has depriv'd us thereof) to *Annual Elections*.

But I have something to urge, as to the *Breach* of our *Trust* in the passing of this Law. It is agreed on all Sides, that whatever the Ancient Constitution might be, yet we were chosen when the Law for *Triennial Parliaments* was, as it is still, in Force; and, that we were, and cou'd be chosen only for the Term of Three Years, if his Majesty should think fit to continue us so long; therefore, to continue ourselves for a longer Term, would be a manifest deceiving of those who chose us, who expected, and could not but expect, at the end of Three Years, to have the Opportunity of a new Choice, and to alter where they found themselves mistaken. It would also be a very great Injustice to many Thousands of others, who have a Right to offer their Service to their Country, and who, for the Honour of the Nation, I am willing to hope, are in all Respects equally qualified for the Service, with us, who have at present the Honour to fill those Seats.

If this Bill were to enlarge only the Continuance of future Parliaments, I should give my Negative to it for the Reasons I have already mentioned; and yet in that Case, the Electors would have
a fair

a fair Warning for what Time they were to chuse, and those Elected, would be truly and properly the Representatives of the People; which I conceive cannot be said with Truth, of the present *Parliament*, if they should be continued beyond the Three Years. This, to me, is an insuperable Objection against this Part of the Bill; for if we may add Four Years to our present Term, may we not add Forty, may we not make our selves perpetual, or even extinguish Parliaments themselves? Nay, what is it which we may not do, or, after this Step, what is it which the People of *Great Britain* may not apprehend that we will do? Can we do any Thing much worse, than to subvert one of the Three Estates of the Realm, and to substitute a new one in the Place thereof, and instead of a House of *Commons* by the Choice of the People, as it always has been, and ever ought to be, to establish a *new kind of House of Commons*, and 'till now unheard of, by Act of Parliament?

The great Partiality which all Parties in their Turns have shewn in the Determination of Elections, has been too long the general Complaint, and one of the greatest Blemishes on the Justice and Conduct of the House of *Commons*; and 'tis certainly a crying Wickedness, and a most dan-

dangerous Practice ; therefore I am willing to hope, that we shall not, by giving our Consent unto the Bill before us, out-do all that ever was done of this kind by former Parliaments. They have chosen only 30 or 40 Members for some particular Places, which is a trifling Peccadillo to what is now attempted, I mean, the chusing of 588 at once, for the whole Nation.

It has been said by some who have spoke in the Debate, “ That we are chosen with full Power to consent to such Laws as we shall judge for the Benefit of the Nation ; that there are no Restrictions or Limitations in our Powers ; and that therefore we may pass such new Laws, or repeal such old Ones, and the *Triennial* Act, as well as any other, as we shall think expedient ; and that by a Repeal of the *Triennial* Act, we shall, after the Three Years, still continue to be the Representatives of the People by Vertue of their former Choice, without any new Election for that Purpose. ” This appears to me to be a plain begging of the Question, and a very fallacious way of Reasoning. I constitute a Person my Attorney with very large and general Powers for the Term of Three Years, and, no doubt, what he shall do pursuant to those Powers, during that Term,

Term, shall bind me, but what he shall afterwards do, is void ; and it cannot be said, that by the general Words of doing all Act and Acts in my Name, that he is enabled to add Four Years more to the Continuance of his Power. I know there are great Disparities between such Powers, and those given by the People to their Representatives in Parliament ; but yet, I think, that to the Purpose I intend it, the Parallel will hold. I will readily agree, that the Powers given by the People to their Representatives are very large ; but I can by no means go the Length of some Gentlemen, to think them absolutely unlimited, or that such ill Use may not be made of this Power, as to amount to a Forfeiture thereof.

Our Histories are full of Instances, and we have a very late one, that *Kings themselves may be guilty of such an Abuse of their Power, as to forfeit the same, and give the People a Right to a new Choice ;* and it will not, it cannot be said, that the immediate Creatures of the People, who have no Pretence to Power, but by Delegation from them, are more absolutely their Masters, or more independent than the Crown it self : Pray consider, whether we can be guilty of a greater Provocation to those we represent, than to deprive them for any Time, of being repre-

represented by their own Choice, and to change the Ancient Third Estate of the Nation, into a new invented one, unknown to former Ages? and whether they will think a little Sophistry, and a few Finesses of Argument a sufficient Reparation for an Injury of so high a Nature?

But I have a much stronger Objection against this Part of the Bill, and cannot help being yet of Opinion, That if it should go thro' all the Forms of an Act of Parliament, pass both Houses, and have the Royal Assent, that it will still remain a dead Letter, and not obtain the Force of a Law; for I am warranted by one of our greatest Lawyers to affirm, that *An Act of Parliament may be void in it self*; and if there are any Cases out of the Reach of the Legislature, this now before us must be admitted to be one; for what can be more against common Sense and Reason, than to be a *Felo de se*, to destroy that Constitution, or any essential Part thereof, upon which our Existence in our political Capacity depends? I am also supported in this by the Authority of learned Divines; I shall mention but one, and I speak it for his Honour, the present Bishop of *Bangor*, who has unanswerably made it evident, "That all People have natural Rights, and that a free People have legal ones, which

“ which they may justly maintain, and
 “ which no legislative Authority whatsoe-
 “ ver can deprive them of.” And can a
 free People have a more valuable Right,
 than that of being fairly and frequently
 represented in Parliament, by Persons of
 their own chusing? This surely is a Right
 as valuable as Liberty it self, being abso-
 lutely necessary to the Subsistence and
 Continuance thereof.

For the sake of those Gentlemen, who
 seem so very fond of the unlimited Power
 of Parliaments, (and by which only they
 can support the Validity of such a Law,
 as the Bill before us is intended to intro-
 duce) I shall mention in some Cases, to
 which they themselves will agree, that
 this unlimited Power doth not, cannot
 extend. As for Instance, Suppose, instead
 of the Bill before us, we should pass a
 Law, as was done in the Reign of *Rich-*
ard the Second (the worst Prince that
 ever sat upon the *English* Throne) That
 the Power of both Houses should be vest-
 ed in Twelve *Great Lords!* or, as was
 done in the Reign of *Henry* the Eighth
 (the first Proroguer of Parliaments) That
 the King's Proclamation, with the Con-
 sent of the Privy-Council, should have
 the Force of Law: Or, as in 1641, That
 the Parliament should not be dissolved or
 prorogued without their own Consents.
 Such

Such Laws as these, thro' Oppression and Violence, have been for some time submitted to; but surely no Gentleman will say, that they ever were, or, should they be now re-enacted, that they would be legally in Force; for, if so, the Parliament of 1641 is still in Being; for I never heard that they gave their Consents to their own Dissolution.

I will suppose one Case more, which has never happened, and God forbid it ever should, That an Act of Parliament should pass to vest the whole Legislative Authority in the single Person of the Prince; to cloathe him with an absolute Dictatorial Power, to extinguish, for the future, both Houses of Parliament, and all other Rights and Privileges of the People; and to put all things hereafter entirely into the Power, and to be disposed of at the Will and Pleasure of the Prince: I am sure no *True Briton* will ever say, that such an Act of Parliament as this would have the least Validity or Force, or be any wise binding on the People. I am sure it would not, but, instead thereof would, in due time, expose the *Authors of it to the just Vengeance of an injur'd Nation*; which I think is a full Proof of what I have affirmed, That the Powers given by the People to their Representatives are not absolutely unlimited,

nor the Power of the Parliament it self so omnipotent as some are willing to suppose it. I therefore hope no one will endeavour to support this Bill by such Arguments as will equally support the Cases I have mention'd, and lead us into the most dangerous and unwarranted Paths; and, on this Occasion, I shall take Leave to put Gentlemen in Mind, that *France*, *Denmark*, and *Sweden*, were formerly Free Nations; and what their present Situation is, and how they have been reduced thereto, is too well known to need to be repeated.

I have been often much surpriz'd at the Boldness of the *Roman* Clergy, in introducing the Doctrine of *Transubstantiation*. How they could have hop'd to prevail with their good Subjects the Laity, to believe so monstrous an Absurdity, and did not rather dread that it would stagger their Obedience, and occasion a general Revolt. But our Histories inform us, that this was done in an Age of the grossest Ignorance, and of the greatest Corruption of Manners: A proper Season for such an Undertaking! Accordingly the *Popish* Clergy laid hold thereof, well knowing, that if they succeeded in this, their Empire was secured, and implicit Faith, without Reserve, would be thereby for ever established; it being evident, that if this prodigious Camel was once swal-

swallowed down, it was impossible afterwards that any thing could stick. I cannot suppose, nay, it were monstrous to suppose, That our present *virtuous and* UNCORRUPT *Ministry*, can, by the Passing of this Bill, have any Design in View parallel to that of the *Romish* Clergy, to plain thereby the Way to some other Laws, which may be thought necessary to the full Establishment of their Power. No, certainly: They are too well satisfied of the Uprightness of their Conduct, to stand in need of any indirect Supports, and too penetrating to think they could obtain them in a Parliament where the Majority are so entirely independent of them, and who in the present, and former Parliaments, have approv'd themselves Champions for the Liberties of their Country. Besides, the present is so far from being an Age of the grossest Ignorance, that never was Learning at so high a Pitch, nor Men arriv'd at so noble a Pitch of *Free-thinking*, that our Motto may justly be, *Nolumus jurare in verba Magistrum*; we scorn the musty Sayings of Antiquity, and will in nothing be pinn'd down by the Dictates of the Learned of this, or of any other Age; therefore 'tis impossible to suppose any such Design in the Bill before us, and yet I am very sorry it hath been attempted, and hope it will

never pass, for the Reasons I have already mentioned, and also lest it should give too great a Handle to People without Doors, to entertain untoward Jealousies and Surmises, who may be apt to say, *That those who can compliment a Ministry with such a Law, can never afterwards refuse them any thing.*

I shall, on this Occasion, put Gentlemen in Mind of the great Debt with which the Nation is incumbred; a Burthen which is become almost insupportable, and ready to crush us into Ruin; and yet, to our great Misfortune, instead of diminishing, it is daily increasing. I have long observ'd the fatal Methods by which this Mischief was brought upon us. I was indeed in great Hopes, that the putting an eternal Stop to the further Increase of our Debt, and the settling the most proper Measures for the lessening thereof, in such Proportions, as in a reasonable time might entirely discharge the same, would have been the very first Work of the present Parliament, as it was the most valuable for the Interest of the Nation; but I'm sorry to see it has hitherto given way to so many other Considerations, which, how important soever they may be thought, I will be bold to say, when compar'd to this, are but like the *Tithing of Mint and Cummin* to the *weightier things*

things of the Law. Surely something must, and very soon too, be done in this Matter; for, I am persuaded, no Man can be so wicked, as to entertain a Thought of declaring the Nation Bankrupt, and paying off this Debt with a *Spunge*, to the utter Ruin of Thousands of Families; and as little can I suppose any Man so stupid, as to sleep securely, whilst the Liberties of his Country, and thereby his own, and the Property of every single Person in the Nation, is in the most precarious Situation: For, should we, loaded as we are, be engaged in a new War with any powerful Enemy, must we not either submit to all the unreasonable Impositions of such an Enemy, or find some extraordinary Means to support such an expensive War? Will it not therefore be our Wisdom to put our Affairs, as soon as possible, on such a Foot, as to make the second Part of the Dilemma practicable, without resorting to so black an Injustice as that I have hinted at, either of *Spunging* out all our past Debts, or at least of borrowing the Funds for the Use of the Publick, during the Continuance of such a War? This surely is a Subject of such Importance, that it will justify the Speaking of it either seasonably or not; nay, I think it never ought to be out of our Minds, till something very effectual be

done therein ; but I mention it chiefly at this Time, to divert Gentlemen from passing the Bill before us, and continuing the present Parliament beyond the Term of Three Years ; lest what shall be afterwards done in so great and so good a Work by this Parliament, if continued, may be liable to Objection, from the Doubts which the Nation may have of the Legality of such a Parliament ; and for the same Purpose, I shall observe, that we seem pinion'd down for a long Tract of Years, and indeed for ever, in the Methods we proceed in, to a *Land Tax* of Two Shillings in the Pound, and to the *Malt*, to support such a Fleet, and such Guards and Garrisons, as in the profoundest Peace, I presume will be always esteemed necessary. The ancient Revenues of the Crown applicable to these Purposes having long since been mortgaged and sold away ; and if our present unhappy Divisions should for some time require a greater Force, for the Quiet and Security of the Nation, even in Times of Peace, 'tis easy to compute how much higher the aforesaid Taxes will rise.

Let Gentlemen seriously consider, whether it will not greatly increase the Uneasiness of the People, under such heavy Burthens, if they think they are laid upon them by Representatives whom they
 21
 never

never chose. For my own Part, I dread the Consequence of such a Law as that which we are now about, and doubt it cannot be long supported in any other Manner, than those extraordinary Laws were for some time, which I have already mentioned; and I am persuaded, 'tis far from the Design of any in this House, that this Law, if it pass, should be supported in that way; and to make a *Standing Army* necessary only to support a *Standing Parliament*; for to me they seem to be Sister-Twins, which can only live, and must die together.

I have now given my several Reasons against this Bill, which appear to me to be so strong, as would engage my Negative to it, were it even in some Measure conducive to the Ends which are pretended; but much more, when I am thoroughly convinc'd, that it is so far from promoting those Ends, that if ever it pass into a Law, it will have a Tendency directly contrary.

It has been said, " That Three Years
 " is too short a Time to effect any thing
 " of great Moment for the Service and
 " Benefit of the Nation; that the first
 " Sessions is generally spent and wasted
 " away in the Determination of Electi-
 " ons; in the second something is done;
 " but that the last Sessions is usually as

“ much lost as the first, Gentlemens Minds
 “ running so much on the ensuing Electi-
 “ on, as to think of nothing else; and
 “ the Fear also of disobliging their
 “ Electors, on so near a View of a new
 “ Choice, becomes a very great Byass on
 “ their Conduct in Parliament, to the
 “ Prejudice of the publick Service; so
 “ that in this short Term of Three Years,
 “ there is little more than the Work of
 “ One Year done.

I am not a little surprized, that such
 Assertions as these, shou'd be made use
 of, as Arguments against *Triennial* Par-
 liaments; because it seems to me to be
protestatio contra factum, as was said by
 a very great Man, of Dr. *Sacheverell's*
 Speech. It is evident, that the Business
 of the Publick was carried on for some
 hundreds of Years by *Annual Parliaments*
 only, and our Histories for that Time do
 not acquaint us with any Complaints
 made of the shortness of their Duration:
 And is it not most notorious, that there
 never were such great Things done by any
 Parliaments, as by those which have been
 holden since the *Triennial Act*? Was ever
 a War so long, and so successfully carried
 on before, and in which this Nation bore
 so great a Proportion of Expence? Were
 ever Sums so amazingly Great, given by
 any Parliament, or Parliaments before,
 in

in the like compass of Time, as has been done by these *Triennial* Parliaments? I affirm, there has been more given by them for the Supply of a single Year, than was given in the whole Reign of any of the Predecessors of the late King *William* the Third, and that the Expence of the publick Service since the Revolution, has amounted to more, than it did from the first Foundation of the *English* Monarchy, down to that Time; and I will venture to add, that they were such Supplies as could have been raised only by Parliaments of a short Continuance; for 'tis not supposable, that the Nation would have remained Quiet under such heavy Taxes, had the same been imposed by a *LONG Pensionary* Parliament, such as that of King *Charles* the Second; but, when they were convinced of the absolute Necessity of such Supplies, from the concurring Sentiments of frequent new Parliaments, they were by this, and, by this Method only, could have been disposed to the chearful Payment of the same. When this is seriously considered, I am persuaded, that no Gentleman will say, That *Triennial* Parliaments are incapable of doing great Things, when it is true beyond the possibility of Contradiction, that they have actually done much greater Things, than were ever done by Parliaments before.

Let

Let us but compare what was done by the Long *Pensionary* Parliament of K. *Charles* the Second, and what has been done in a like Number of Years by *Triennial* Parliaments, and then the Preference will be easily determined: And surely Arguments from Matters of Fact and long Experience, ought to be of much greater Weight than those, which depend only on conjectural and ill grounded Surmises, and a fanciful Way of Reasoning.

I will agree, that much Time is spent, not only in the first, but in the second Year, in the Determination of Elections; but if these were all, without distinction, left to the Committee appointed for that, it wou'd not make so great a part of the Business of the House, as it has of late Years done: And if the Right of Election, for the several Cities and Boroughs were unalterably fix'd, and not chang'd from time to time, with respect to the Petitioners and sitting Members, the Work, even of the Committee, would be greatly lessened. And I must say, That whenever Gentlemen are in earnest, disposed to cure this Evil, it may be done to the Honour and Reputation of future Parliaments, and to the saving nine Parts in ten, of that Time, which has of late Years been consumed in the Business of Elections; and therefore surely this Inconveniency can be no Objection

jection against *Triennial Parliaments*, which is not owing to that, but to very different Causes; and which cannot possibly be cured by the Repeal of the *Triennial Act*; but may be done, if not entirely, yet, in a great Measure, by proper Provisions for that Purpose.

As to the Inconveniencies suggested to the Third Sessions of Parliament, from the near Approach of a new Choice; it will be much the same against the Second Sessions, in which something of Business is admitted to be done: For, I see but little difference between the Influence, which the Prospect of a new Choice will have, at the end of One, or at the End of Two Years. The Objection therefore, as to this Purpose, is altogether trifling; but I will agree, that it has its Weight, if it be urged for the *long Continuance*; and greater still, if it be urg'd for the *Perpetuating* the present Parliament; for then indeed, Gentlemen would be freed from all Anxiety, about a future Election, and wou'd be under no Restraints, nor have any Byass on their Minds, from the Sentiments of those who chose them; but surely it ought not to be thus, nor is this a Compliment fit to be made to the Electors of *Great Britain*, and is far from being a suitable Return for the Honour they have done us; 'tis monstrous to suppose, that we should

should render our selves disagreeable to the People, by a faithful Discharge of our Duty ; and doing that which is best for the Interest of the Nation.

Surely we our selves in the first Part of this our first Sessions, notwithstanding all the Time spent in the Determination of Elections, have been able to find time to give all the necessary Supplies for the Service of the Nation ; but perhaps we have made some Discoveries in this Age unknown to former ones ; we have a Glimpse of some Light undescry'd before ; yet it will still be true, that this Light has sprung up but very lately among us. And altho' this Consideration cannot weaken the real Strength of the Argument, yet it lays it under the Imputation of Novelty, and will be a full Justification of the Integrity, if not of the Sagacity, of those who shall persevere in their Opposition to the Bill.

As to the Failure in the *Triennial* Act of answering the Expectations of the Nation, it has been only asserted in general Terms, and I cannot easily guess at what is particularly meant ; for it has certainly answered all the Ends which from the Preamble of the Act we can apprehend to have been expected by the Makers thereof, or which indeed, in the Nature of the Thing, cou'd have been expected from it ;
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for, surely, the Grievance, which had been felt, of a very Long Parliament, is thereby redress'd, and the Constitution of frequent new Parliaments, in Part, retrieved, and brought nearer to what it anciently and originally was.

As to the Increase of *Bribery and Corruption* in *Elections*, since the *Triennial Act*, it is impossible it can be owing to that Law, or that it would be any wise diminished by a Repeal thereof; and, in Fact, the Encrease of *Bribery and Corruption* in *Elections* may have happened since that Law, and yet be no wise a Consequence thereof; 'tis contrary to Common Sense to imagine, that those who would purchase their Seats in Parliament, would give more for a *Triennial*, than for a *Septennial one*, or for a *Continuance during Life*; or that such Electors, who will sell their Voices, have not Arithmetick enough to proportion their Prices to the Times they chuse their Representatives for. Therefore this Objection against the *Triennial Act* is certainly very frivolous, unless something much further be intended, than I believe any *Briton* has yet the Courage to speak out, I mean, unless it be intended, before the Expiration of the Seven Years, to add a further Term by another Act, and so on: Then indeed there is an effectual stop put to all future *Bribery and*
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Corruption in Elections, if the last Election which the People had, is to be the last they shall ever have.

This brings to my Mind a very scandalous Pamphlet, which came out a little before the Election of the present Parliament; I think the Title of it is *English Advice to the Freeholders of ENGLAND*: This Author takes great Pains to divert the People of *England* from chusing a certain Party of Men, whom he unjustly paints in very black Colours; and amongst others, there is an Expression to this Effect. “ Don’t give your Vote for any of
 “ these People, whatever they may offer
 “ you; for, depend upon it, if there
 “ should be a Majority of them in Par-
 “ liament, it is the last Vote you will
 “ ever have the Opportunity to give. I am persuaded it is far from the Intentions of any Gentleman here, to contribute to the Credit and Reputation of that Author, by giving even a Colour of Probability to the Truth of any of his *Predictions*; and this, I hope, will also have some Weight, to prevent a Repeal of the *Triennial Act*; since that will have the Air of the first bold Step towards the fulfilling of this wicked *Prophecy*; and the making use of the Argument I have been endeavouring to explode, will not a little heighten the Suspicion; it being evidently

ly of no Force in any other View, but that of carrying the Matter to the Length which this Author has foretold. But surely Gentlemen need not thus hunt about either for the Cause or the Cure of *Bribery* and *Corruption* in Elections.

On the late happy Revolution, by which our Religion and Liberties were preserved, we were unavoidably engaged in a very expensive War; and, had it been carry'd on by Supplies within the Year, as it is evident it might have been, our War and our Taxes would have ended together; and we should have been then as able, when justly provoked thereto, to begin a second War, as we were to undertake the first. But, unhappily for *England*! this Method was not pursued; but instead thereof, the Nation was by Piece-meal exposed to Sale; and *execrable* surely will their *Names* be to *latest Posterity*, who at first began, or have been since, the chief Supporters of this accursed Practice, by which One Third Part at least of the great Sums given have been lost to the Service of the Nation, which now remains loaded with a Debt of *Fifty Millions*; besides, at least the Sum of *Seventy Millions*, which has been actually rais'd and paid. From hence it followed, that by the great Burthens on our Trade, a new Spring of Commerce more secure and beneficial

neficial having arisen, I mean the *Publick Funds*, almost the whole numerous Body of our wealthy *English* Merchants, who were formerly the Glory of our own, and the Envy of other Nations, have thrown all their Money into this new Channel, and have left the ancient Trade, from which *only* the Wealth of the Nation can arise, to be carried on by Men of small Fortunes, who Trading only upon Credit, are little more than Factors for the Manufacturers of *England*, who by this unnatural Transmigration, are now become the Merchants of the Kingdom; and under these Disadvantages a great Part of our Trade, which was formerly carried on with Vigour by our own, is now fallen into the Hands of Foreign wealthy Merchants, and, I am afraid, irreparably lost to us; the inevitable Consequence of which hath been, Ruin to Thousands and Thousands of *British* Families. And 'tis as evident, that by the long Continuance of the Land and Malt-Taxes, and the high Prices of all things, by the Addition of new Excises, the greater Part of the midling Gentry of the Kingdom are half undone; and even our greatest Commoners, and the Nobility themselves, have very sensibly felt these Pressures upon the Publick; and, if the Distress more or less has become almost universal, no Wonder
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if it has plained the Way to Bribery and Corruption, and dispos'd those who had the Opportunities of doing it, to partake of the general Plunder, and to repair their own at the Expence of the publick Losses.

The *Funds*, as I am informed, produce above Three Millions yearly towards the Interest, and sinking of some Part of the Principal of our Debt. This great additional Revenue, tho' the Property of private Persons, is entirely under the Management of the Officers of the Crown, and thereby a Dependence vastly greater, on a Ministry, has been created, than ever was before, or could otherwise have been; and what Influence this has had on our Elections throughout the whole Kingdom, the Acts of Parliament which have been made to prevent the same, sufficiently proclaim. We have now an *Army of Civil Officers*, as dangerous as any *Military Force*, entirely at the *Devotion of a Ministry*; and altho' we may run no Risque from this in the Hands where his Majesty has now plac'd the Administration, yet we have formerly been, and may again be in Peril, from this adventitious Power, of the total Loss of our Constitution.

The Short of the Case seems to me to be, That some Ministers, have, by their Conduct, gone a great Way to beggar the

K Nation;

Nation; and others have corrupted those who have been so undone: And in this unhappy Situation of Men and Things, the publick Money has been employ'd to corrupt Electors and Returning Officers, and thereby have fill'd some late Parliaments with the Creatures of a Ministry, and many have likewise expended vast Sums of their own, when they saw it necessary to get or secure a Place; and by this Means, these *Parliaments* have been filled with great Numbers of *Mercenary Troops*, whose Names were scarce known in the Countries where they were chosen, and without any Family Interests of their own, or the Assistance of those who had; and if there has been any Bribery on the Parts of those who have opposed such Men, as perhaps there may, it has been occasioned by the vile Arts which have been put in Practice against them. So, I think, I may truly affirm, That *Bribery* and *Corruption* in Elections have not followed as any Consequence of the *Triennial Act*, but from Causes widely different; and that the Foundation thereof was at first laid, and has been since improved and carried on by *wicked and designing Ministers*. As to the Cure of this Evil, I am afraid, it cannot be thoroughly effected, whilst the Nation labours under the present heavy Load of Debt;

Debt; and for this and many other Reasons, it does not a little concern us to make all the Progress we possibly can, in so great and so good a Work, as is the Discharge thereof.

As to the Heats and Animosities, which are likewise charged to the Account of the Triennial Act, and the Burthen and Grievance of frequent expensive Elections, I shall readily agree, That the Frequency of Elections is directly intended and design'd by the Triennial Act, to prevent the mischievous Consequences of *long continu'd Parliaments*: But surely no one will say, That this, simply and abstractedly, is a Burthen or Grievance; and, as to the great Expence in Elections, and the violent Heats and Animosities about them, they are not in the least owing to the Triennial Act, as I have already shewn: And I presume no Gentleman wou'd desire to extinguish the ancient *English* Hospitality, for which the Nation has been so long fam'd; nor can any Man imagine it more possible to cure all Heats and Animosities in Elections, than to prevent Contentions about them, which the laudable Ambition of serving the Nation hath formerly kept up, and I hope it will do so again, without the Help of any other Motives; but besides, I am persuaded, that Contentions arising from so wor-

thy a Principle, and the old *English* Hospitality, will do no Harm. It is strange, that any one Gentleman can fancy, that the passing the Bill before us into a Law, would cool our Heats, and settle us all in Tranquillity; it seems to me to be calculated for the direct contrary Purposes; to blow up the Flame, and to fill up the Measure of the Nation's Discontents; for 'tis impossible to conceive, that the Electors of *Great-Britain*, of whatever Party or Denomination they may be, will not be highly incens'd by such a Law as this; and if they should universally turn their Resentments against those who, without their Choice, have made themselves the Representatives of the People; I leave Gentlemen to judge, whether this would not be an Animosity of a much more dangerous Consequence, than that which we are pretending to extinguish by this Bill.

It is also urg'd, That these frequent Elections are a great Encouragement to the *Idleness and Debauchery* of the *meanest and lowest* of the People; Opportunities only to gratify the Drunkenness and Lewdness of the Mob. I am sorry, that there are any Excesses, to give Foundation for this Complaint; but surely the Evil proceeds from the same Cause, and must be cur'd in the same way with those others, which I have already taken notice of,

of, to have been objected to the Triennial Act. And I mention this now, only to observe, what *pretty Epithets* are given to the *Electors* of *Great-Britain*. It was with Concern, that I heard them lately treated in this Manner in another Place, but could never have believed it possible to have heard any thing like it hinted within these Walls. How low and mean soever they may be, they are still the People of *Great Britain*, and we are one of the Three Estates of the Realm, by a Power derived and delegated from them. And are we then only the *Representatives* of a *lewd, drunken, debauch'd Mob*? To paint out the *Commons* of *Great-Britain* in such contemptible Colours, is surely doing great Dishonour to our selves, and is equally ungrateful and unjust to them. I think we represent all the *Commons* of *Great-Britain*, and surely amongst them there are many Thousands every way as well qualified to fill these Seats, as we who have now the Honour to do it. And even, as to those of an inferior Rank, it must be own'd, that they are a *Brave* and a *Gallant People*; and when we compare them with those of other Countries, we have Reason to be in Raptures with our own happy Constitution, which has made such a Difference between them and other Men. They are bred up from their Cradles with

deep Impressions of Liberty; and have their Properties fenc'd in, and secured by Law; and by their Representatives in Parliament, they have the Honour to share even in the *Legislative Authority*; and 'tis this gives our People the Spirit and Resolution of the ancient *Romans*, by which our Nation has obtain'd and preserv'd its great Character in the World.

It is thus we ought to describe the People of *Great-Britain*, and we shall then only do them the Justice they deserve. But if, on the contrary, we shew an Inclination to depreciate their Value, and seem to be ashamed of those we represent, will it not, especially if we pass the Bill now before us, give the strongest Jealousy, that we intend to represent them no more, but to set up, for the future, a *third Estate entirely independent of them*. And this Jealousy will be still encreased, by what has been, with too great Freedom, discours'd of without Doors, That the People must be governed by their Fears; and surely so they must, if this Bill pass, for I think it will be scarce possible afterwards to govern them by LOVE. Unhappy *Britain*! To have brought forth Children so unnatural, as to treat thee thus! For whatever may have been put in Practice in former Times, the Doctrine of Slavery was never so
openly

openly avowed before. What! *Govern a Free People by their Fears!* Monstrous Expression! and certainly a form'd Design corresponding thereto is an Act of Treachery as foul and black as a *Briton* can be guilty of: A high Crime and Misdemeanour it certainly is; I will not call it High Treason, because I know no Law of the Land which has yet declared it so.

The Argument which I shall next take Notice of, is that which seems to me to be mentioned as the chief Inducement in the Preamble of the Bill, and which has been chiefly insisted upon by the Gentlemen who have spoken for it; “ Because
 “ of the Danger from the general Dis-
 “ contents, and great Disaffection of the
 “ People, which some Gentlemen are ap-
 “ prehensive, were a Parliament now to
 “ be called, would produce a Majority of
 “ very different Sentiments from those
 “ who now compose it.” Others, who think better of the Inclinations of the People, believe, “ that this wicked Work
 “ could not be accomplished without the
 “ Help of Foreign Money to Bribe and
 “ Corrupt the Electors of *Great Britain*;
 “ but, upon the whole, are of Opinion,
 “ that the thing would be effected; and
 “ that, instead of the present excellent
 “ House of Commons, so devoted to the
 “ true Interest of their Country, and to

“ the Support of his Majesty, and the
 “ Protestant Succession, we should great-
 “ ly risque the having such a Parliament
 “ as would be ready to call in the Pre-
 “ tender, and to deliver up their Coun-
 “ try to Popery and Arbitrary Power;
 “ and therefore those who are against the
 “ Bill are charg’d with contributing to
 “ his Design, altho’ they are charitably
 “ believed no wise to intend the Thing.
 And this I think is the full Import of what
 has been said by Gentlemen on this Head
 of Argument.

As to the Danger which some Gentle-
 men imagine, of an ill Parliament, were
 it now to be chosen, from the Help of
French Money, it is, in my Opinion, a
 Reproach to the present Ministry, to fan-
 cy that they would be outdone or out-
 witted by *France* in this, or in any other
 way; and I think, that the defeating of
 such an Attempt is the only Case in which
 a Ministry might unblameably apply the
 publick Money in the Business of Electi-
 ons: I wish it never had been, or may be
 done on any other Occasion. But why do
 Gentlemen believe, that the *Regent* of
France will meddle in our Elections?
 Surely, not long since, he had a much
 better Opportunity to have distress’d us,
 had he been so dispos’d. On other Occa-
 sions we hear, I mean without Doors, of
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the good Understanding between his Majesty, and that Prince; and that the Pretender will very soon be oblig'd to travel beyond the *Alps*; and this certainly is highly probable, if the *Regent* have any *Expectations* of being himself one Day *King of France*. I shall say no more of this, and believe those, who made the Objection, scarce expected that any one would have taken so much notice of it.

As to the Danger of an ill Parliament, from the great Disaffection of the People; This, I confess, is a most extraordinary and surprizing Argument, and such as I never thought I shou'd have heard in this Place; for it is an open Declaration and Acknowledgment, that the People of *Great Britain* are not truly Represented at this time; That the present House of Commons are the Supporters of the Liberties and true Interest of the People, which the People themselves are endeavouring to destroy, and wou'd effectually do so by a new Choice; and therefore they are to be treated like *indiscreet Children*, and not to have their Frowardness humour'd at the Price of their Undoing. This indeed is telling the People of *Great Britain*, in the plainest Terms, that as they are not at present truly Represented by those whom they did chuse, so for the future, they shall be Represented *without any Choice*

Choice at all. If this be the way to Ingratiate with the People, what is it which can give them a Disgust? No, certainly this must make it absolutely necessary to govern them by their Fears, and to take such Measures as are proper for that Purpose; a Design so black, that I cannot suppose it has yet entered into the Heart of any *Briton*.

It is amazing to hear this very Suggestion, in my Opinion far distant from the Truth, not only on the Present, but on other Occasions, so frequently made use of as an Argument; for were it really true, can it be any Service to the Publick to be making daily and hourly Proclamation thereof? For can this be a proper and a likely Means to strengthen the Hands of his Majesty, and his faithful Subjects, or to weaken those of the Pretender, and his foreign and domestick Friends, to publish to all the World (for what is said in this Place can be a Secret no where) that the Difaffection to his Majesty is very General, and the Party of the Pretender so considerable in the Nation, as to risque another Rebellion in his Favour, if they had the Opportunity of assembling together in Numbers on a new Election, or any other Opportunity equally propitious to their Purpose; and if this did not happen, that still there
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wou'd be Danger, that the Majority on a New Election, wou'd be in the Interest of the Pretender; and that this wou'd not be less, perhaps might be more fatal, even than a Rebellion. A Bill founded on such Surmises as these, and Supported with such Arguments, is highly dangerous, and if it passes into a Law, its Title ought to be, *An Act for the most effectual Encouragement of the Pretender and his Allies, to invade this Kingdom*; in my Conscience, I believe it so, and that so it will be found, if this Bill should pass into a Law.

I believe it will be admitted, that from the first Establishment of the Succession, until it happily took Place, a vast Majority of People express'd the greatest Zeal for it, and Satisfaction in it; That from the Death of the Queen, to the Arrival of his Majesty, the Nation was never known to be in a greater Calm. That the Parliament then in being unanimously settled the Civil List for the Support of the Dignity of the Crown, and compleated what was wanting for the Supplies of that Year; and whatever Faults they might have been guilty of before, there was nothing now wanting in the expressing of their Duty; and it has been surmis'd, that some Persons whose Zeal for his Majesty cannot be suspected, were
not

not a little apprehensive, that that Parliament, and the Party of which their Majority was compos'd, wou'd, to make amends for their past Conduct, go too great Lengths in their *Complaisance* to the Crown; and that for this very Reason, it was dangerous for the Nation, that his Majesty shou'd ever meet them; but whatever the Reasons were, certain it is, that his Majesty saw them not. The Joy on his Majesty's Arrival was as Great and Universal, as was ever known in *Britain*: and from hence I think I may fairly conclude, that if there be such a Disaffection as is suggested, since it was not before, it must have happened since his Majesty's Arrival; and if this can be imagined possible, it must be then agreed, that such a general Disaffection is an Effect too considerable to be produc'd without any, or by a very slight Cause; his Majesty surely can be no wise the Cause of so surprizing a Change, as is surmis'd, in the Inclinations of his People; therefore if there be such a Disaffection, it can be only to the Ministers, and produc'd from something really ill, or which is apprehended to be so, in their Conduct. I am perswaded that they themselves have too much Modesty, not to agree, that 'tis much more reasonable to suppose a Disaffection to them, than to the Person of the King; and

and I doubt not but this House will always *distinguish*, as they have hitherto done, *between the Sovereign and the Ministers of State*.

But in Justice to the present Ministry, we must conclude, that the Disaffection to them is occasioned only by imaginary, and not by any real Evils done by them; and we have great Reason to hope, that by their wise and prudent Management, they will be able, in a very little Time, to undeceive a mistaken and deluded People, and thereby regain those Affections, which, for the present, they apprehend to be lost to them. And if they shou'd fail in this, I am persuaded, from their great *Zeal for the Quiet of the King, and Welfare of their Country*, from their *known Disinterestedness*, their *generous Contempt of Advantages to themselves*, and from that *ancient Heroic Roman Vertue*, which so visibly appears in every part of their Conduct, that they themselves wou'd become Suppliants to his Majesty for Liberty to retire from the Burthen of their Trust, and to repose the same in such Hands, as might put an end to the Disaffections which are now now complained of. And I am the more confirmed in this Opinion, because I my self have heard some of the greatest Mⁿ now in Power, before they were so, express themselves in such a
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manner, as left me no room to doubt of the Sincerity of such a Disposition.

There is yet one part of the Objection which I have not touch'd upon, the Danger which is apprehended of an Invasion from Abroad, and the Insurrection at Home, should a New Parliament be called at this time; and this, I think, is the only Thing which I have heard mentioned, which has the Colour of an Argument for a longer Continuance of the present Parliament; but I believe, when 'tis a little examined, it will appear to have the Colour only, and to be *Vox & praterea nihil*. I think I have already made it evident, that there is no such Disaffection to his Majesty, or his Royal Family, as is suggested; and if there be not, then the Danger of any Invasion or Insurrection on that Supposition, falls entirely to the Ground. But even admitting the Disaffection to be as it is suggested, 'tis still agreed, that the whole Nation is not disaffected, but only some part thereof; and that therefore the meeting together, on the Occasions of Elections (which are not made all on the same Day) wou'd consist of mixt Multitudes of well, and of ill-affected Persons, so that the former might balance the latter.

But admitting that not only the Disaffection is, but that the calling of a New Par-

Parliament at this time, wou'd be, as the same have been Represented, yet this will not prove that there's any Necessity at this time for the passing the Bill, which is the Subject of our present Debate. I do most readily agree, that if this Parliament were to expire in a very short time, and that the publick Meeting of the People would really be of such a dangerous Consequence in the present Juncture, as has been mentioned; That then absolute Necessity which always has been, and ever will be, a Justification of extraordinary Steps, would equally justify the prolongation for a Time, of the present Parliament, in the Manner now propos'd; and no doubt but that the next succeeding Parliament conven'd in the usual legal Manner, wou'd approve and confirm what shou'd be done in this, on so pressing an Occasion. But surely it will no wise follow, because this might be done in a Case of absolute Necessity, that therefore it may or ought to be done, when there is no Necessity at all. And it is evident, that there is no immediate Necessity for the passing of this Law, since, notwithstanding the Length of the first, his Majesty may still have two Sessions more of this very Parliament; and will it not be time enough to pass such a Law in the last Sessions, if it should then appear

appear as necessary as it is now pretended to be? And therefore admitting every thing which has been alledged, there is not the Colour of a Necessity for such a Law at present; and this gives me strong Suspicion, that there is a *Snake in the Grass*, and that we have not yet been acquainted with the true Reason of so unprecedented an Attempt. Certainly no Gentleman can be afraid of what every Gentleman must wish, that before the end of another Year, our Ferment will subside, and the Nation be restored to a perfect Calm, which would entirely take away all pretences of doing what is now endeavoured: Or, that the unanimous Voice of the *Electors of Great Britain*, against such a Law, would, before another Sessions, be found too strong to be resisted by their Representatives; and that Gentlemen, upon a more mature Consideration, might come to think very differently of this Matter from what they at present may; and that therefore this great Master-piece must be struck off at one Heat, and that now or never must be the Word: Or may not others without Doors be apt to suspect, that this Law is really intended to encourage the Pretender to invade, and his secret Friends to shew themselves in publick; by soothing them up in the Hopes and Belief of the Greatness of their Numbers;

bers; and by leading them into that Snare, have an Opportunity of discovering and crushing them as thoroughly in *England*, as we have lately done in *Scotland*; and thereby secure for ever the Peace and Tranquillity of the whole Kingdom? For it is impossible to imagine, that such Encouragement would be given to the Pretender or his Friends, as seems to be done by the Preamble of this Bill, and the Debate of this Day, if those who were for the Bill were not entirely satisfied, that a new Rebellion, if it should happen, would be attended only with the Consequences I have just now mentioned. How right a Design of this kind may be in Politicks, I will not pretend to determine, but will venture to affirm, that it is entirely inconsistent with the Christian Religion, and the Principles of Humanity, common to all Mankind.

But besides, I think an Experiment of this kind much too dangerous to be try'd; for, when the Fire is once kindled, no human Wisdom can tell how much it may consume. And altho' we have happily suppress'd the late unnatural Rebellion, yet, I am persuaded, no Wise Man can wish, to serve any End whatever, to see the Nation expos'd again to the Risque of such another Attempt, altho' it should be as ill concerted at Home, and

as little supported from Abroad, as the last seems to have been. Such Motives as these, therefore, can surely prevail with no Body, and yet I am not able to guess at those which shou'd: And where no visible Reason does appear, for so violent and needless a Precipitation, there must, and will be great Variety of Conjectures at those which are not seen.

Another Argument seems to have great Weight with some Gentlemen for the passing of this Bill; "That it will encourage Foreign Princes and States to enter into Alliances with us, when they see a certain fix'd Administration, on which they may depend; for that at present they look upon us to be in the Nature only of a *Triennial Government*, a New Parliament being usually attended with a new Ministry, and a new Ministry with new Measures.

I believe that this is the first, and I hope it will be the last Time that ever an Argument of such a Nature was advanc'd, or would have been endur'd in any *English* or *British* Parliament. We have hitherto been able to form great Alliances, and to do great Things, on the Foot of our ancient Constitution. And are we now sunk to a Condition so despicably low, as to be obliged to model it to the Genius or Humour of any of our Neighbours? Can
a *Brit*

a *Briton* hear this with Patience? Absolute Monarchy, and despotick Power have no Doubt, in some Conjunctions, the Advantage of our Form of Government; but shall we, for the Sake thereof, give up the most valuable Constitution upon Earth? So adapted to the Spirit of our People, and so well suited, in the general Circumstances of Life, for the Welfare and Happiness of a Free Nation, and by which we have hitherto shone forth with a distinguishing Lustre from all other Countries in the World. But as to the Argument it self, why do Gentlemen imagine, that *Triennial Parliaments* necessarily infer a *Triennial Government*? Surely the executive Power is entirely in the Prince; there the Laws of the Land have placed, it and there I hope it will for ever remain; The Power of Peace, War, and Alliances, are the undoubted Prerogatives of the Crown, and no Parliament, I hope, will ever pretend to dispute the same. The Stability therefore of our Government, as it relates to Foreign Nations, depends entirely on the Prince: And, I believe, our ancient Allies never had, nor had Reason to have, a greater Reliance on any *British* Monarch, than on his present Majesty, who so worthily fills the Throne; and, I hope, that Reliance will never be transfer'd from him to any Ministry supported by

any Parliament whatever; which I think would be of the most dangerous Consequence to the Royal Dignity, the Liberties of the People, and to the true Interests of all our sincere Foreign Friends. But I am also at a Loss to find out any necessary Connexion between a *New Parliament* and a *New Ministry*, were there any Weight in that Objection; for, are not the publick Employments in the Disposal of the King, and whilst they are executed to his Satisfaction, will be continued in the same Hands? And when they are not, 'tis unfit they should. And whatever Changes his Majesty may at any time happen to make, I am perswaded, they will be always such, as will be most for his own Service, and the Welfare of the Kingdom. And I must declare the same Opinion as to Employments, as I have done with Relation to Seats in Parliament: That there are great Numbers in *Britain*, every way as well qualified for them, as the present Possessors; and, how great soever my Esteem may be for the *present Ministry*, I can't carry my Compliment so far, as to think, that the Nation would be *undone*, if they were *laid aside*. But if by the passing of this Law, the present Ministry should be effectually establish'd, which is more than any Man can pretend to prophesy, what

Encou-

Encouragement could this in Reality give to the forming of foreign Alliances? when by the same Law 'tis fully insinuated, and plainly admitted in the present Debate, That the Affections of a very great Part of the People are lost to this very Ministry; for my own Part, I think it is doing them the greatest Wrong, and furnishing foreign Princes and States with the strongest Arguments against entering into any Alliance with us. For it is not their being supported by a Majority of this House, that will be any substantial Encouragement, if it is believed that a Majority of the Nation are in very different Sentiments.

Five Hundred and Fifty Eight Gentlemen of *Britain*, abstractedly considered, were they all unanimous, bear but a small Proportion to the Number in the Nation; but when they sit within these Walls, cloathed with the Authority of the People, and are thought to speak their Sense, 'tis then indeed that they will have the full Weight of the Commons of *Great-Britain*. It is evident, that the present Ministry and Parliament were in Being, when the late Rebellion broke out, and that notwithstanding of all other proper Measures, Six Thousand *Dutch* Troops were thought necessary towards the Suppressing thereof; they had not certainly been

otherwise sent for ; nor wou'd any *Briton* have dar'd to have given such Advice ; what Judgment then must that, and other States and Princes form from hence, of the Situation of our Affairs, especially when by this Law we proclaim aloud, that our Heats and Animosities do still continue, and that there are still very dangerous Dispositions towards a new Rebellion ; and if this be an Encouragement to enter into, and depend upon our Alliances, I know not what can be a proper Discouragement.

I am therefore in hopes that this Bill will not pass. Instead of such extraordinary and unnatural Projects as these, there are others that deserve our Attention. I think it would be a Design worthy of a *British* Parliament, to concert and execute the most proper Measures for the healing up of our Breaches, and uniting our Minds for the common Interest and Safety of the Nation. The first Step absolutely necessary towards this great Work, seems to me to be, the forgetting all past Party-Quarrels, and extinguishing, for the future, those odious Names of Distinction, which have been so long, and so unhappily kept up : And I will venture to say, that this Expedient towards Unanimity is much more Christian, less dangerous, and, tho' difficult, yet much more practicable, than

than the Extirpation, or total Suppression of either of the contending Parties, which the unthinking Furioso's of both seem to be too fond of.

I would not have Gentlemen discourag'd in endeavouring what I recommend, from any Difficulties which they may conceive therein; for surely *there was a Time, and not long since*, when this blessed Work cou'd not have miscarried; I hope it is still practicable, or else the Nation will be soon undone; for, we are sure, that a Kingdom divided against itself will be brought to Desolation. But, as to the Possibility of the Thing, let me put Gentlemen in Mind of the great Heats and Animosities, which were raised and continued by the unexampled Violences and Cruelties of a long and bloody Civil War; yet these were all appeas'd in the very Beginning of the Reign of K. *Charles the Second*, after his Restoration, the History of that Time being sufficiently known, I need not repeat the Measures which were then taken; certain it is, the Nation enjoy'd a Calm for many Years, our Trade flourish'd, our Wealth increas'd, and we were both in the literal and allegorical Sense, a Land flowing with Milk and Honey; and this I hope will be again our Case. I would also recommend the Payment of our publick Debts, or at least

of putting them in a Way of being discharg'd in some reasonable Time ; for till this is done, we are, in my Opinion, in a State of the greatest Insecurity : For what Foreign Prince or State will either court the Friendship, or dread the Enmity of a Bankrupt People ? For tho' particular Persons are really rich, the Nation, whilst loaded with a Debt of Fifty Millions, is undoubtedly very poor ; and is it not a melancholly Consideration, that when the Individuals are very wealthy, that yet the Nation should be very weak. This is indeed a Paradox, but greater still, that Men can be so infatuated, as to sleep secure under a Government, which can scarce be said to be in a Condition of giving them Protection, and that too when it is in their own Power to redress the Evil.

Before I sit down, I must observe, that this Bill is brought in by no Order of this House, nor has arose on any Motion in it, but is a *Present* sent us by the *House of Peers*. I do not say, that their Lordships have not a Right to send us this, or any other Bill they please, a Money-Bill excepted ; but since it chiefly, if not wholly relates to our own, and the Rights and Privileges of those we represent, it would more naturally, in my Opinion, have had its Commencement here ; and this Consideration

deration inclines me to believe, that it had not been easy to have found one among us, who would have been willing to have made himself remarkable, by being the first Mover of so extraordinary a Law, so likely to disgust a vast Majority of the People. But there are other Reasons assign'd, and pretty freely talk'd of without Doors, for beginning this Bill in the House of Lords; that thereby Time would be got, and *proper Arguments applied*, to convince Gentlemen of the Necessity of this Law, who, when it was first spoke of, seem'd to be very much prejudic'd against it; and 'tis said, that there has been great Pains taken for that Purpose, and not without Success. But 'tis said, that the main Reason against beginning it here, was to take off that Byass, which was apprehended might be upon the Minds of Gentlemen, from the Doubtfulness of its Fate in another Place; for tho' the Lords have, we have not an Inheritance in our Seats, but depend, for a Continuance of them, in future Parliaments, on the good Opinions of the Electors of *Great-Britain*; and to *deprive them of the Right of frequent Elections*, which they are *now entitled to by Law*, cannot be suppos'd a proper *Recommendation* to their Favour; and it was therefore convenient to remove this *Stumbling-block* out
of

of the Way, that the Advocates for the Bill might Argue and Vote with greater Assurance. But I hope the Resolutions of this Day will fully make appear, how false and groundless these and such like Suggestions are, and that we cannot be deterred from a faithful Discharge of the Trust reposed in us, or influenced against it, by any Motives or Considerations whatsoever; and that those Gentlemen particularly, who have sat long in Parliament, and, on all Occasions, have so worthily distinguish'd themselves by being the greatest Advocates for the Rights and Liberties of the People, will at this time shew the World, that they continue fix'd and steady to the Principles they have always profess'd. *I therefore hope, that a Law, which even the worst Ministry, in the worst of Parliaments, never had the Wickedness to attempt, will not actually be establish'd under the Best Administration, and in the Best Parliament with which this Nation was ever bless'd.*

A SPEECH



A
S P E E C H
A G A I N S T

Sir R----- W-----'s

P R O P O S A L, &c.



AGREE with *the*
Honourable Person who
spoke first, That on
His Majesty's Happy
Accession to the Throne,
there ought to be no
other *Contention* amongst Us, than
who should most contribute to His
Service,

Service, than who should express their *Duty*, and *Loyalty*, in the most *Respectful* and the most *Extensive manner*. But then I hope he will agree with me, That this is to be done, with *some Regard to Those We Represent*: That this is to be done, consistent with *the Trust* reposed in us, consistent with *that Frugality*, which *this House is bound to use*, whenever *the Crown* is pleased to call upon it, to exercise its *Great Power of giving Money*.

No w, notwithstanding what has been urged, I think we shall so far depart from *this Rule of Frugality*, as we exceed the *Revenue* granted to *His late Majesty*, whether *that Exceeding* shall amount yearly to *Ninety Three Thousand Pounds*, as computed at the highest by *the Honourable Person*, or to *Above an Hundred and Thirty Thousand Pounds*, as I have seen it *more truly* computed by *Another*.

ther. For I remember very well, that the yearly Sum of Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds (tho' now thought too little) was not obtained for His late Majesty, without a long and solemn Debate ; and it was allowed by every one that contended for it, to be an *Ample Royal Revenue*. Nor was it ask'd inconsiderately, and on a sudden ; it was asked on mature Deliberation, after the *Queen's Civil List Branches* were found deficient ; it was asked after many Computations had been made of every Charge requisite to support the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, and to maintain the present Royal Family : It was asked after duly weighing, what Provision would be sufficient to answer all the ordinary and extraordinary Occasions of the Civil Government ; what would be sufficient to answer all Proper Augmentations of Salaries, all Reasonable and Charitable Pensions, all Secret Services at Home and Abroad, necessary
to

to carry on a just and wise Administration: It was asked by the Honourable Person Himself, and Others, who were entering into great Employments, who were going to taste of the Royal Bounty, and who therefore could not possibly be suspected to have any Design of cramping His Majesty, by a too contracted and narrow Revenue.

NOR does the late Alteration in the Royal Family call for any Increase of Expence. For if the Establishment for the Queen should be enlarged, whose Distinguished Character, and many Princely Virtues (taken Notice of in Your Address) entitle her to all Degrees of Grandeur, which any former Queen Consort ever enjoy'd; I say, if Her Establishment should be enlarged, I presume the Establishment for Prince FREDERICK will be much inferior to that settled on His present Majesty, when Prince of Wales. Besides, our ardent Wishes for His
Maje-

Majesty's constant Residence in these Kingdoms, and His Royal Intentions of making us a great and happy People, give us Hopes, that many Personal, many Particular Expences in the late Reign, especially those for frequent Journies to Hanover, will be discontinued, and entirely cease.

NOR is it any Objection to the Reasoning of that Time, when the Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds were granted to the late King, or to the Computations then made, that This Sum is said to have been found by THE EXPERIENCE OF PAST TIMES, to be answerable to the Necessities of the Civil Government.

FOR THIS EXPERIENCE could not be found in the Queen's Reign, because Her Civil List Branches seldom amounted to Six Hundred Thousand Pounds, commonly to about Five Hundred and Fifty Thousand

B Pounds,

Pounds, and sometimes to a very little above Five Hundred Thousand Pounds, as appears by Accounts formerly laid before this House, and I will not suppose those Accounts, which were brought from the Treasury to be otherwise than true, in Regard to my Honourable Friend----- I ask Pardon-----I should have said, the Honourable Person, for there is no Friendship betwixt us. But He must give me Leave to observe, That when He asserts, Her Civil List Branches amounted to above Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds yearly, He can only mean the gross, and not the neat Produce, which is a very Uncandid and Fallacious way of Arguing.

THO' Her Revenues were so low, yet She called upon Her Parliament but once in a Reign of above Thirteen Years, to pay the Debts contracted in Her Civil Government; and it is a Justice due to the Memory of

of *That Excellent Princess*, to remind Gentlemen of the *unparallel'd Instances of Her Piety and Generosity*, which occasioned *those Debts*. She gave the *First Fruits and Tenths*, arising now (as the *Honourable Person* says) to *Nineteen Thousand Pounds a Year*, for the *Augmentation of the Maintenance of the Poor Clergy*. She gave *Five Thousand Pounds a Year* out of the *Post-Office* to the *Duke of Marlborough*: She suffer'd *Seven Hundred Pounds a Week* to be likewise charged on the *Post-Office*, for the *Publick Service*, and by that *Concession* lost a *vast Sum*; the *Additional Duty* then producing only *Eight Thousand Pounds a Year*. She gave *several Hundred Thousand Pounds* for building the *Castle of Blenheim*. She allowed *Prince Charles of Denmark* *Four Thousand Pounds a Year*. She sustained great *Losses by the Tin Contract*. She supported the *poor Palatines*. These, with many other *Royal Boun-*

ties * (which escape my *present Remembrance*) were the Reasons, that brought Her under a *Necessity* of asking for *Five Hundred Thousand Pounds*. But She was so sensible of the *Inconvenience*, and so determined never to apply to Her Parliament again in the like Manner, that She ordered a *considerable Reduction* to be made of Her Civil Government *Expences*. I have seen a *Scheme* of that *Reduction*, as it was actually settled a little before Her Death, and intended to commence the Lady-Day following. 'Twould be tedious to go thro' all the particular *Articles* of it, and I will only name three or four. The *Cofferer's Office* Payments were reduced from *Eighty Five Thousand Pounds* to *Seventy Five Thousand*. The *Allowances* for *Foreign Ministers*,

* She gave An Hundred Thousand Pounds to the Uses of the War.

from

from Seventy Five Thousand Pounds to Thirty Thousand. Pensions and Bounties from Eighty Seven Thousand Four Hundred and Ninety odd Pounds, to Sixty Thousand. Secret Services from Twenty Seven Thousand Pounds to Twenty Thousand; a Sum surprisingly small! when compared with the late Disbursements on that Head. In short, the whole yearly Expences were designed to be Reduced to Four Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Forty One Pounds; and that would have been done, without eclipsing the Glory of the Crown, which some Gentlemen so roundly affirm, cannot Now be maintained under almost a Double Appointment.

FROM hence it appears plainly, that this Argument of THE EXPERIENCE OF PAST TIMES, can have no Reference to the Queen's Reign. It must therefore be applied tho' put in the Plural Number) to
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the late Administration Only ; and I confess, if the same Management was to be continued, if the same Ministers were to be again employed, a Million a Year would not be sufficient to carry on the Exorbitant Expences, so often, and so justly complained of in this House. For it is Notorious, it is Fresh in all our Memories, that besides the Tearly Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds, there have been many Occasional Taxes, many excessive Sums raised, and they have been All sunk in that bottomless Gulf of Secret Service. First, the memorable Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pounds were raised (in Defiance of the ancient Parliamentary Methods) to secure us from the Apprehensions of a Swedish Invasion. Then the two Insurance Offices were erected in as Irregular a Manner, by a Bill brought into this House (at the latter End of a Session, and after the Committee of Supply had been closed)

by

by the Honourable Person, on His Return into Power, and those Bubbles payed near Three Hundred Thousand Pounds for their Charters. Then a new Scene of Affairs opening in Sweden, changed our Enmity into an Alliance; there was a Subsidy of Seventy Two Thousand Pounds implicitly granted to make good some secret Bargain, and Engagement with that Crown. At the same time, near Twenty Four Thousand Pounds were given for burning two Merchant Ships arrived from infected Places. But tho' the Goods, as well as the Ships, were payed for by this House, that they might, without Injury to the Owners, be destroyed for the publick Safety, yet most of them were privately conveyed into the Counties adjacent to the Port where the Ships lay, and Sold there. Then soon after a Sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pounds was demanded and granted for the Payment of the Civil List Debts:

Debts : On which Occasion *His late Majesty* declared in *His Message*, that *He* was resolved to cause a *Retrenchment* to be made of *His Expences* for the future. But notwithstanding that *Resolution*, in less than four Years (*the Necessities of the Government* having rendered the promised *Retrenchment impracticable*) there was a new *Demand*, and a new *Grant* of *Five Hundred Thousand Pounds* more, to discharge new *Incumbrances*. I might mention too *the Spanish Ships* which were taken in *the famous Mediterranean Sea-Fight*, and (as we have Reason to believe) sold for a considerable *Sum of Money*. Nor is it possible to forget *the Hundred and Twenty Thousand Pounds*, which we could only be told the last Session (in a general unexplained *Article*) were **secretly** disposed of, for *the publick Utility*, for the *Conservation of the Peace of Europe*, and for the

the *Security of the Commerce, and Navigation of Great Britain.*

AFTER all These and Other *Extraordinary Supplies* (I am informed) there yet remains a *Debt in the Civil Government of above Six Hundred Thousand Pounds*. If so, surely there must have been a *most egregious Neglect of Duty*, to say no worse; there must have been a *Strange Spirit of Extravagance* somewhere, or such *Immense Sums* could never have been so soon, so insensibly squandered away. And it is amazing, *this Extravagance* should happen under the *Conduct of Persons* pretending to surpass all their *Predecessors in the Knowledge and Care of the Publick Revenue*: But we are not to wonder, that the World has been *very free in its Censures*, since none of *these Sums* have been accounted for, since they have been employed in *Services not fit to be owned*. None but those, who were in the

C Secret,

Secret, and who had *the Disposal* of them, can refute *the Reflections*, that are made without Doors, not only on *the Ministry*, but even on *both Houses of Parliament*.——— I must say no more.——— But I heartily wish, that *Time* (the great Discoverer of *hidden Truths*, and *concealed Iniquities*) may produce a **List** of *All Such* (if any *Such* there were) who have been perverted from their *Publick Duty*, by *private Pensions*, who have been **the Hired Slaves**, and the corrupt **Instruments** of a **profuse**, and **Uain = glorious Administration**. If there have been none *Such*, then the whole Weight, then the whole Guilt of the *late Mismanagements* lies on *the Ministers themselves*.

BUT it seems to be Matter of *universal Joy* to the Nation, that *the Case* is like to be *altered*. We hope
we

we are arrived at a Day of better *OEconomy* ; we hope *such Practices* will be so far from being *imitated*, that they will be *detested and abhorred*. Nor can any one entertain the least Doubt of this, when He considers a *Prince is ascending the Throne*, who will choose a *knowing, faithful and frugal Ministry* ; who will not permit *His Domestick or Foreign Affairs* to be negotiated by *Bribery, and Corruption*, for want of *Sufficiency and Skill in Politicks* ; Whose Wisdom will enable Him, and whose *Goodness* will incline Him, not only to *inspect the Management of His Civil List Branches*, but in *Justice to His Parliaments*, and in *Compassion to His People*, to *direct and require a due and exact Disposition of all the Other Publick Fonds*, according to their *respective Appropriations*.

Now, in Consequence of this most just Notion of *His Majesty's*

Frugality (which amongst other His innumerable *Virtues*, endears Him so much to His Subjects) I hope I may without Offence, propose the Addition of some *Words* to Your *Question*, that may restrain it to *Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds*; and in this I as much consult the *Service of His Majesty*, and the *Honour and Dignity of the Crown*, as Those, who are for granting the *Fonds* without any *Restriction*. (For in my humble Opinion) the *Voting a greater Sum* than was settled on His late Majesty, is only *Voting an Indemnity*, is *Voting at least in Favour of Ministers*, whose *Conduct* (as I have already hinted) if laid before You, and duly *Examined*, would perhaps rather deserve Your *Censure*, than *Approbation*.

BESIDES, the *Surplus of these Branches* is appropriated to **The Sinking**

Sinking Fund ; and *That*, I thought, had been a *Sacred Depositum*, reserved for the gradual *Discharge of the National Debt*. I thought it would have been look'd upon as a *Sort of Sacrilege*, to have diverted the least Part of it (on any Pretence whatsoever) from *its original Uses* ; and it is as surprizing to me, that *The Honourable Person* should be for destroying *His own Darling Project* ; that He should be for pulling down *the boasted Monument of his Glory*, as it may be to others, that I am for supporting any *Scheme of His*, which might have transmitted *His Name with Advantage to Posterity*.

IF *His Majesty* was rightly apprized of *these Circumstances*, He would doubtless rather be content with a clear annual Revenue of *Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds*, than suffer

suffer *His First Demand of Money,* (by any *precipitate Proof of our Zeal*) to carry the least Appearance of being *burthensome to His People,* who have long laboured under *the Pressure of Grievous and Exorbitant Taxes.* For He has been graciously pleased to signify from *the Throne, His Fixed Resolution,*

By all possible Means to merit their Love and Affection, which He shall always look upon as the best Support and Security of His Crown.


I WILL detain You, Sir, no longer, but desire You would conclude *Your Question* with these Words,


In

In like manner as they were granted and continued to His late Majesty, which may make up the clear yearly Sum of Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds.



In like manner as they
were granted and contin-
ued to His late Majesty
which may make up the
clear yearly sum of
seven Hundred Thousand
Pounds.





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